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On 8 June 1973 the Commission submitted to the Council its proposals 
on the strengthening of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament. 
The Council consulted Parliament on these proposals on 27 June 1973. 
The Committee on Budgets appointed Mr Spenale rapporteur on 21 June 
1973. It submitted its first interim report to the Parliament (Doc. 131/73) 
at the part-session of July 1973. 
By its resolution on Mr Spenale's interim report in July Parliament 
set up a working party which met on 30/31 July and 19 September 1973. 
The Committee on Budgets continued discussing these proposals at its 
meetings of 17 July, 13 and 27 September 1973. At this last meeting it 
unanimously adopted the motion for a resolution submitted by the rapporteur, 
Mr Spenale. 
The following were present: Mr Aigner, deputy chairman and acting 
chairman: Mr Rossi, deputy chairman; 
Mr Durand, Mr Kollwelter, Mr Nolan, 
Mr Spenale, rapporteur: Mr Artzinger, 
Mr Notenboom, Mr Patre, Mr Pounder. 
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A 
The Committee on Budgets hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the communication from 
the Commission of the European Communities to the Council on the strengthening 
of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to Declaration No.4 of the Council annexed to the Treaty 
of 22 April 1970; 
- having regard to the ratification of that Treaty by the Parliaments of 
the Member States and to the debates which took place in connection 
therewith; 
- having regard to the proposals from the Commission to the Council (COM 
(73) 1000), 
- having regard to its resolution of 5 July 1973, 1 
- having been consulted by the Council on 27 June 1973 (Doc. 124/73) 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and to the opinion 
of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 175/73); 
I • UNDERTAKINGS 
1. Points out 
l 
2 
- that the budgetary powers which will be conferred upon it from 
l January 1975, the date from which 'the budget of the Communities 
shall ••••• be financed entirely from the Communities' own resources', 
are insufficient; 
- that in April 1970 the Commission undertook to submit new proposals 
for an increase in these budgetary powers, and the Council agreed to 
consider them 'pursuant to the procedure of Article 236 of the Treaty'; 
- that in its resolution of 13 May 19702 Parliament noted these 
undertakings, on the sole basis of which it recommended that the 
national parliaments should ratify the Treaty of 22 April 1970; 
- that the debates in these Parliaments revealed an almost unanimous 
determination to see the powers of the European Parliament strengthened, 
particularly-in the budgetary field, and that this determination 
should be taken into account; 
OJ No. C 62, 31 July 1973, p. 29 
OJ No. c 65, 5 June 1970, p. 32 
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- that the new Member States of the Community were aware of Declaration 
No. 4 of the Council aiming to increase budgetary powers 'according to 
the procedure provided in Article 236', and did not contest it: 
2. Maintains that the budgetary powers which must be conferred upon the 
Parliament under the own resources system as from the 1975 budget cannot 
be fully effective until legislative powers have also been granted 
3. Reminds the Commission that it has undertaken to submit proposals on 
this matter in September 1974; 
II. PROPOSALS ON BUDGETARY POWERS 
4. Affirms that budgetary power comprises essentially the fight to: 
- create revenue: 
- approve expenditure 1 
- discuss and adopt the budget 
- supervise its implementation 
A. CRBATXOH OF REVENUE 
-------------------
5. Recalls that Article 4 of the Decision of 21 April 1970 ratified by the 
Member States endorsed the princip l.e of financial autonomy : 'from 
1 January 1975, the budget of the Communities shall ••••• be financed 
entirely from the Communities' own resources' 
6. Reaffirms that financial autonomy cannot be guaranteed in the future, 
unless the common resources can be adapted to the needs of common 
policies by common procedures: 
7. States that these procedures must be such as to allow the governments of 
Member States to refer the matter to their national pariiarnents as and 
when required to do so by their constitutions: 
B. Proposes, therefore, that decisions should not be adopted by Parliament 
on a proposal from the Commission without the prior unanimous consent 
of the Council: 
9. su,gests that, as the cost of Conununity policies has to in any case be 
met in the medium term, from 1 January 19,75 the annual percentage of VAT 
assigned to the Community could, if necessary, be fixed by Parliament at 
between land 2%, on a proposal from the Commission and with the unanimous 
agreement of the Council; 
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I 
B APPROVAL OF EXPENDITURE 
-----------------------
10. Recalls that, in all parliamentary democracies, Parliament alone can 
approve new expenditure, even when the constitution restricts the right 
to propose such expenditure to the Executive: 
11. considers therefore that the Commission's proposals on this matter, stip-
ulating only a second reading for any decision of principle with major 
financial implications extending over several years are: 
- restrictive in scope 1 
- not sufficiently effective. 
12. Notes, however, that the agreement of Parliament and the Council is 
highly desirable in this case, and should be sought wherever possible 
13. Proposes therefore that a coordination council should be set up, consisting 
of members of Parliament, the Council an.d Commission., to seek an acceptable 
solution in the event of failure to reach an agreement: 
14. Requests that, if agreement still cannot be reached, the decision should 
rest with Parliament 1 
C 
(a) acting by a majority of half its members plus one, ~mless the Council 
acts by a qualified majority 
(b) if the Commission agrees with its opinion or if it.acts by a majority 
of half its members plus one and two thirds of. the votes cast, unless 
the Council acts unanimously 
(c) definitively, if it acts by a majority of half ~~~mei1i1:?,ers plus one 
and three quarters of. the votes cast; 
DISCUSSION AND ADOPTION OF BUDGET 
--·--------------------..-:----------
15. Maintains that the present distinction between other expenditure and 
expenditure arising from the Treaties or from acts adopted in pursuance 
thereof is artificial and should be abolished 
16. Enddrses, in the meantime, the Commission's proposal that the category 
of expenditure on which Parliament has the final decision, pursuant to 
Article 203, should be progressively extended to all expenditure not 
arising automatically from previous decisions with long-term implications. 
]7. Asserts that the distinction between the two types of expenditure should 
be drawn in agreement with Parliament: 
PE 33.890/fin 
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18. Insists on formal acknowledgement of the fact that Parliament's right 
to adopt the budget includes the right to refuse to adopt it and to 
reject the draft budget in whole or· in part; 
19. Requests, furthermore, that Articles 203, 204, 206, 209 of the EEC Treaty 
and the corresponding articles in the ECSC and EAEC Treaties should be 
amended in accordance· with the principles of this resolution 
D SUPERVISION OF_IMPLEMENTATION 
20. Points out that it has frequently deplored the inadequate auditing 
methods in the Communities and called for the establishment of an 
effective and independent external auditing body in the form of a 
European Court of Auditors; 
21. Welcomes the Commission's proposals to this effect 
22. Asserts, however, 
ij that the members of the Court of Auditors, who must.be canpletely 
independent, must be appointed in agreement with Parliament. 
(b)that the Court must report to Parliament and be ready at all times 
to assist and advise it in the exercise of its auditing rights; 
23. Welcomes the proposal to the effect that Parliament alone, on a 
recommendation of the Council, should in future give a discharge in 
respect of the budget 
CONCLUSION 
24. Reaffirms that it cannot, under the own resources system, endorse any 
proposal which does not confer real budgetary power on the represent-
atives of the people of the Member States of the Community 
25. Requests therefore: 
(a) that the Commission should review its proposals in the light of 
this resolution; 
(b) that the Council should not take any decisions without first 
consulting Parliament; 
26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of 
its committee to the Council and Commission of the European Communities. 
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B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Introduction 
A) On 12 June 1973 the Commissxnsubmitted its proposals for the 'streng~h-
ening of the budgetary powers of the Parliament' (Doc. COM(73) 1000 of 
6 June 1973). In, the preamble it state~: 
'In 1970 the Commission undertook to submit proposals to strengthen 
the budgetary powers of Parliament, and the Council has undertaken to 
examine them. The corresponding two texts are concerned explicitly with 
the procedure for revision of the Treaty. The time is particularly well-
chosen, for 1975 will be the year of the first real budget of the Commun-
ities and the Commission's proposals would have to apply from 1975'. (Doc. 
1000 (73) COM). 
B) On 5 July 1973 Parliament discussed these proposals and adopted a 
resolution (OJ No. C 62, 31 July 1973, pp. 29 and 30). 
C) This resolution was the culmination of a general policy debate; the 
I 
Commission's proposals were considered satisfactory in many respects but 
definitely unsatisfactory on cert,ain points. 
D) Satisfactory proposals: 
1. Financial independence of the Communities: 
'(paragraph 5) (Parliament) welcomes the fact that the Commission has 
\ 
proposed, in conformity with the Opinion of Parliament, that additional 
own resources may be introduced by Community procedures requiring 
unanimity in the Council and a decision of Parliament taken by an 
absolute majority of its Members and three-fifths of the votes cast;' 
2. Powers and means of Control: 
'(paragraph 13) welcomes the.Proposal to the effect that Parliament, 
acting on a recommendation of the Council, will in future give a sole 
discharge in respect of the budget;' 
'(paragraph 14) welcomes, subject to ce~tain provisions of detail, the 
principle of the establishment of a Court of Auditors for the European 
Communities •••••••• • • 
E) The main point which was unsatisfactory was the question of the procedure 
for deciding on new expenditure. 
Parliament stated that: 
'(paragraph 10) where major rule-making decisions with significant budgetary 
implications are concerned, the second reading procedure proposed by the 
Commission is inadequate;' 
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and that: 
'(paragraph 11) the European Parliament should have the final say as regards 
the financial implications of any ne~ measures'; 
and concluded that: 
'(paragraph 15) it cannot endorse any proposal which, all in all, does not 
give real budgetary power to the representatives of the peoples of the 
Community;' 
F) With ~~gard to the implementation of these conclusions Parliament 
proposed: 
'(paragraph 12) the establishment of a joint working party of its 
Political Affairs and Budget Committees to examine in detail, together with 
the Commission, the latter's proposals .••••. ;' 
This working party was set up with Mr GIRAUDO, chairman of the Political 
Affairs Committee, as chairman. 
The other members were: Members of the bureaux of the Political 
Affairs Committee and the Committee on.Budgets {Lord GLADWYN, Mr RADOUX; 
Mr AIGNER. Mr ROSSI): the rapporteurs of these two committees (Mr KIRK, 
draftsman for an opinion; Mr SP!NALE, rapporteur); a member of the Group 
of European Progressive Democrats chosen from the Political Affairs 
Committee (Mr de la MELllliE); a non-attached member chosen from the 
Committee on Budgets (Mr FABBRINI); Mr SCHUIJT, chairman of the study 
group on structural problems of the European Parliament. 
G) In spite of the difficulties of working during the holiday period, 
your rapporteur is of the opinion that the group had worked very efficiently 
in instigating the exchange of ideasana drawing together a number of points 
of view which had initially been fairly divergent. 
Your rapporteur feels justified in saying that the group made a great 
effort of imagination, realism and common determination to arrive at 
practical solutions. Mr KIRK's contribution was particularly useful. 
The rapporteur has tried to bear in mind the points contained in the 
resolution of 5 July 1973 which were clearly of binding force for both the 
working party and the committees concerned. He has therefore attempted to 
propose solutions, not only from personal conviction but also in deference 
to Parliament's unchanging position (repeated once again in the policy 
resolution of 5 July 1973), in order that Parliament may have the final 
say on the financial implications of any new measures. 
H) Some may find these proposals too limited, and your rapporteur has to 
admit that he was hoping for more extensive reforms. Others may consider 
that the proposals go too far; this is perhaps because they are basically 
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an attempt at a compromise. 
I) We were, in any case, walking a tightrope; some of our colleagues 
thought that the budgetary powers we were claiming were too wide, in that 
they deprive national parliaments of the power to take decisions which, by 
their very nature, should be taken by those parliaments. Others thought -
at least at the beginning - that budgetary power is insignificant 
in itself, and that our proposals should extend to a claim for legislative 
power. 
J) We had to prove to the first group that in the system that has been 
operating since the Treaty of Rome, Community institutions already have -
without any legal or other limitations - the power to take decisions on 
expenditure and consequently on Conununity revenue. This revenue is made 
up of financial contributions from Member States, and national parliaments 
may not refuse them. 
The right to take these decisions could not be conferred upon national 
parliaments without jeopardizing conunon policies in the event of disagree-
ment between them, and therefore endangering the existence of the Community 
or wh~t goes under that name. The strong democratic convictions of our 
colleagues should certainly lead them to agree with us that the European 
Parliament, as the only representative of the peoples of the Community at 
Lhis level, must at this stage be endowed with the normal powers of an 
elected parliament in a modern democracy. 
The only question which remains is, therefore, on what institutional 
rules these Conununity decisions - hitherto the exclusive responsibility of 
the Council - should be based. 
K) The second group were reminded that we must comply with the deadline 
of 1 January 1975 in respect of the budgetary powers, and that all the 
c,,rnrnunity institutions gave an undertaking to this effect in April 1970 
which was noted by the national parliaments of the original six Manber 
st~tes and has therefore acquired an additional binding force. 
The three new Manber States were also aware of this undertaking and 
its implications when they signed the Treaties of Accession, and they had 
no reservations about it. If its effects are to be implemented in time (in 
other words before the 1975 budget is drawn up) the decisions to be submitted 
to the national parliaments must be taken immediately. As for the 
legislative powers, the Conunission has undertaken to submit proposals on 
this matter in September 1974, which will be too late for the budgetary 
powers. 
It could be added that, if Parliament is given real powers in respect 
of the financial implications of legislative acts, a system of co-decision 
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between the Council and the Parliament will result as long as the Council 
retains its legislative power, since budgetary resources cannot be allocated 
without the consent of Parliament. This should encourage cooperation and 
compromise between the two institutions, which is what the majority of members 
of our Parliament hope for. 
L) The first fundamental change since the Treaty of Rome will take place 
on 1 January 1975. As the President of the Council, Mr HARMEL said, when 
the own resources system is established the Communities will have attained 
their political majority. 
In any parliamentary or modern democracy 'political majority' 
prEsupposes a balance between the institutions, in which the Parliament has 
real powers. This is therefore one of the most important of the current 
debates. 
The proposals drawn up as a result of the discussions of the working 
party and the Committee on Budgets are based on the premise that budgetary 
power comprises the right to: 
- create revenue 
- approve expenditure 
- discuss and adopt the budget 
- supervise its implementation 
0 
0 0 
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I• FINANCIAL AtJrONOMY AND THE CREATION OF NEW RESOURCES FOR THE 
COMMUNITIES 
1. Article 4 of the Council Decision of 21 April (ratified by the 
Parliaments of the Member States and agreed to by the acceding 
countries) sets forth the principle of financial autonomy, which 
presupposes the possibility of adapting resources to the known and 
accepted needs of the Communities. 
Moreover, although Article 50 (2) of the ECSC Treaty makes it 
possible for the European Coal and Steel Community to grant itself 
the resources necessary to meet its needs, Article 201 of the EEC 
Treaty, which at all events is out-dated and should therefore be 
rewritten, does not allow the European Economic Community to confer 
upon itself, on the sole authority of its own Institutions, any 
additional resources, even when purely mechanical effects of common 
policies already initiated seem likely to show that these resources 
are inadequate. 
A) 1HE SITUATION BEFORE THE TREATY OF 22.4.1970 AND SINCE THE SIGNATURE 
OF THIS TREATY 
Before 1970 
2. The Communities already had one independent source of revenue: 
the ECSC levy. Other revenue had been decided upon by the Community 
Institutions but was collected by the States for their own benefit: 
~gricultural levies, duties in the common external tariff. 
3. ~he final implementation of the Common Customs Tariff, which 
abolished all customs duties at internal frontiers,gave full effect 
t, 1 •. he Customs Union but, at the sane time, caused certain revenue 
distortions between the Member States, notably to the benefit of the 
Nether.lands, thanki:; to its major po1.ts on the Rhine, and to the 
detriment of the Federal Republic of Germany, this situation has 
given ~ise to vigorous complaints. 
4. 1'he 5n1position of agricultur:11 Levies for the benefit of importing 
States also had the effect of reducing Community preference. 
5. 'l'hus, there were serious disadvantages in collecting, for the 
benefit of Member States, resources decided upon by the Communities 
without linking such action to the determination of the scales of 
national contributions to the Community budget. A revision of the 
Treaties was called for, converting this revenue, which came from 
common policies and was decided upon by the Community Institutions, 
into own resources for the Communities. 
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6 In its principles, the 1970 reform was designed to achieve 
financial autonomy for the Communities. Article 4(1) of the 
council Decision of 21 April 1970 states that 'from 1 January 1975 
1 the budget of the Communities shall, irrespective of other revenue, 
be financed entirely from the Communities' own resources'. 
7. Hence, the 1970 reform consisted in: 
a) converting revenue decided upon by the Community Institutions 
as a result of common policies into own resources for the 
Communities, i.e. agricultural levies, tax.on sugar and, 
gradually, duties in the common external tariff, 
b) creating a new source of own revenue in the form of'VAT, fixed 
each year within the framework of the bud~etary procedure at a 
rate not exceeding 1%, in order to ensure the adequacy of 
Community revenue and hence the financial autonomy of the 
Communities. 
8 1t should be noted that there is an analogy between this VAT 
!Pvy, which is fixed annually at a rate not exceeding 1%, and the 
ECSC levy, collected each year, with the same maximum limit of 1%, 
on coal and steel activities for actions appropriate to the ECSC. 
9. The ECSC levy is specifically earmarked, but it also differs 
from the VAT levy in another important aspect. Under Article 50 (2) 
of the ECSC Treaty, the rate of the ECSC levy may not exceed 1% 
'unless previously authorized by the Council, acting by a two-thirds 
majority'. 
No such provision is made for VAT. 
As a result the ECSC may, if the need arises, increase 
its own res<:>Urces by pure Community procedures in order to meet the 
p~eds of the policies pursued by European Coal and Steel Community, 
whereas the EEC cannot since Article 201 lays down that provisions for 
the modification of own resources shall be recommended' to the Member 
States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements' . 
1This mainly involves financial contributions from Member St~tes for 
supplementary Euratom programmes (Art. 4, (6), para. 1). 
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10. Thus, if financial autonomy is defined as the ability to meet 
the needs of common policies with the aid of common revenue decided 
upon by common procedures, then the ECSC enjoys such autonomy W1ile 
the EEC does not, even if existing own resources are sufficient in 
1975 to cover the needs of the community budget. 
Regrettable though the principles may be, the facts of the 
situation give even more cause for concern since there is a danger 
that the development of common policies which seem essential and 
which would be generally desirable may become impossible. 
11. Indeed, certain own resources tend not to grow at the same rate 
as the needs of the common policies, which for the most part are still 
in an embryonic stage and will require considerable funds if they 
are to be effectively implemented at Community level. 
It seems likely that agricultural levies may even decrease as 
the self-sufficiency resulting from Community preference tends to 
improve. 
Similarly, the duties in the common external tariff also show 
a tendency to decrease as a result of the growing liberalization of 
trade, international negotiations in GATT, trade agreements, and the 
implementation of 'generalized preferences', etc. 
In the same way, the enlargement of the Communities will result 
in the imposition of charges on the three new Member States proportional 
to the economic strength of these countries, but the revenue will be 
less than proportional since the Community will not receive the duties 
accruing under the Common Customs Tariff on all the trading activities 
of the three D3W countries (these duties would be proportional to 
their economy). 
it will gain the duties corresponding to their trade with third 
countries, which is considerably less, and 
lose the duties which were collected under the CCT on trade 
between the six founder members and the three acceding countries. 
12. Conversely, the needs of the common policies are bound to increase 
if the Community is to become something more than a mere customs union 
built around the common agricultural policy. 
If Europe is to achieve a worthy image it will have to adopt an 
attentive and positive approach to 
workers, through a true social policy, 
geographical handicaps, through a true regional policy, 
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the Third World, through a generous policy of development aid. 
All this, without taking intr:> account the problems of economic and 
monetary union, research and energy, suggests that a c'onsiderable 
increase will be needed in the financial resources of the Conununities. 
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B. THE COMMISSION'S NEW PROPOSALS OF 12 JUNE 1973 
13. In its proposals of 12 June 1973, the Conunission therefore restated, 
with a few variations, the proposals it had already made in 1969. 
Article 201 would be replaced by the following provisions: 
'The Conunission shall examine in what manner the Conununity's own 
resources could be raised either from the fiscal revenue of the 
Member States, particularly revenue accruing from harmonized 
taxes, or from direct or indirect taxes introduced for the benefit 
·of the Conununity. 
In every fifth year the Council, after receiving a report from 
the Conunission and consulting the Assembly, shall examine whether 
and in what manner new resources should be introduced for the 
Conununity. 
The Council, acting on a proposal from the Conunission and by 
aqreement with the Assembly, may make provision for new resources 
for the conununity or amend the assessment basis for the Conununity's 
existing resources. The Council shall act unanimously and 
the As--:embly by a majority of its members and of three-fifths of 
the votes cast.' 
1-1. 'I'hese proposals have given rise to several observations: 
a) The idea of periodically and systematically reviewing the intro-
duct.1.on ui new resources for the community (para 2) should be made 
mvre flexible in order to avoid the necessity to wait for the end of 
a five year period in cases of urgent and indisputable need and, 
c~nversely, to avoid the temptation of granting, after such a period, 
rno>:c funds than are absolutely necessary with a view to counteracting 
the aDove danger. 
rt is therefore suggested that the expression 'every five years' 
should be replaced by 'at least every five years' . 
b) .·wo main objections have been raised in connection with the 
third paragraph. 
TIE first concerns the idea of amending 'the assessment basis 
for the Conununity's existing resources' in order to procure new 
budgetary funds. 
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The Community's own resources have until now related either to 
international trade (levies and customs duties) or to e
1
conomic and 
consumer activities (value added tax). 
Your rapporteur at first thought that it would be difficult to 
modify the assessment basis in such areas without affecting trade 
relations within the Community or the economic networks of the 
Member States. 
It therefore seemed preferable to introduce ways of modifying 
'the level' of resources for the Communities. 
However, more careful consideration of the situation showed 
that the fixing of the level of resources for the Community was 
already regulated in various ways which, in many cases, ~id not lie 
within the power of the Community authorities. 
The rate of customs duties is fixed by general negotiations 
on international trade. Levies are a function of both domestic 
prices and world prices. The annual rate of VAT is 'fixed within 
the framework of the budgetary procedure' (Council Decision of 
21 April 1970, Article 4, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 2). To 
a certain extent, the same is true of the ECSC levy. 
The final conclusion was that the best factor on which to act 
in order to increase the financial resources of the Community as and 
when the need arose, was the 'maximum level' of own resources that may 
be raised from previously harmonized fiscal systems. 
(c) The other objection related to the Institution which will be 
ultimately responsible for decisions on new resources for t~e 
Communities. 
The Commission proposed that this should be the Council. 
Your rapporteur believes that it should be the Assembly. 
Since the majorities required would remain the same (unanimity in 
the council, one half plus one of the members of Parliament and 
three-fifths of the votes cast), the difference here had no bearing 
on the problem of institutional balance, which remains unchanged. 
The idea that the Assembly should have the last word has both 
a symbolic and a practical value. 
Symbolically, it is preferable that here, as in all parliamentary 
democracies, elected representatives should decide on taxes. 
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At the practical level, it is preferable for the Assembly to deliver 
its opinion only after the Council has acted unanimously. 
This gives the national Governments represented in the Council the 
time to seek from their national institutions the advice and constitutional 
safeguards they may need before taking a decision. 
In this way there is no danger that a vote requiring a very difficult 
special majority in Parliament could again be called into question by the 
council, whose members above all need political safeguards from their 
national institutions. 
Finally, as far as the Parliaments of the Member States are concerned 
it is easier and more satisfying to accept that new Community taxes have 
been imposed by the common Parliamentary institution (where they are 
represented). 
(d) In view of the above remarks, the proposed wording for paragraph 3 is 
as follows: 
'The Assembly, on a proposal from the commission and in agreement 
with the Council acting unanimously, may, acting by a majority 
of its members and of three-fifths of the votes cast, modify the 
existing maximum level of own resources or establish new 
resources.' 
C. REMARKS ON THE 1973 PROPOSALS 
15. The~e proposals have aroused some misgivings in the working group and 
the appropriate cornrnittees. 
The most important of these concerns the fact that the national 
Parliaments would be excluded from the procedure for establishing new 
own resources. 
This is an important point. 
'l'he reply must be given in the lighL of current procedures. Inasmuch 
as the communities' resources are made up, even at supplementary level, of 
fij\ancial contributions fran t' e Hember States, it is the Council which, 
in deciding the expenditure, also decides the revenue, i.e. the contributicn 
of each State on the basis of the scales of contribution applicable to the 
category of expenditure concerned. 
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We do not know of any Government in any Member Sta~e that has taken 
the precaution of consulting its national Parliament in advance in order to 
find out whether it consented to the financial contribution, which is 
presented as a European decision and as something which must be paid by 
virtue of the Treaty of Rome. 
Admittedly, when the national Parliament votes on, or to be more exact 
'ratifies' these financial contributions, it may open a debate, criticize 
its government - to the extent to which it knows its true position - or even 
pass a motion of censure. 
In fact, very few debates of this kind have ever taken place and, in 
any case, the national Parliament cannot refuse to 'ratify' the national 
contribution, which is entirely comparable to a debt resulting from an 
international agreement. Hence, the proposed procedure cannot, as far as the 
determination of Community revenue is concerned, deprive the national 
I 
Parliaments of a power they have never had since national financial 
contributions were introduced. 
On the other hand, by giving the European Parliament a power of co-
decision in the determination of the Communities' own resou~ces, a power 
which it could obviously never lay claim to where national contributions are 
concerned,we should be taking a step in the direction of a better democratic 
balance in the Communities. 
It should be added that the system proposed by your rapporteur, in 
which the Council, acting unanimously, would have to deliver its opinion 
I 
first, makes it much more likely that the Governments would he encouraged, 
hefv~e adopting a position in the Council, to consult their parliaments and 
thus to explain to them in advance common policies which they intend to 
pt:r.sue and the funds which they intend to allocate to them (cf. above 13 d). 
16. (a) n,,e fin;,l objection was made to the above arguments. One member 
of the committee on Budgets put forward the view that although the national 
Par! iamf 1:t.s could not evade the obligation to supply financial contributions, 
wlu,:h ·:·. nstitute an item of national expenditure, at leas:t in this system they 
retained their power over fiscal revenue raised in their own countries. 
This point is also valid and an explanation is called for. 
(b) The existing resources of the Communities were fixed without the 
participation of the national parliaments. The agricultural levies and the 
duties in the common external tariff are decided upon without the consult-
ation of any parliament. The maximum rate of the ECSC levy can be modified 
in agreement with the Council acting by two-thirds majority. It is only the 
maximum rate of Community VAT that cannot exceed one percent without the 
approval of the national authorities. 
- 20 - PE 33.890/fin. 
(c) On the other hand, the Decision of 21 April 1970 lays down the following 
as own resources: 
- levies, premiums, additional or compensatory amounts, additional amounts 
or factors and other duties established or to be established by the 
institutions of the Communities in respect of trade with non-member 
countries within the framework of the common agricultural policy, 
and also contributions and other duties provided for within the frame 
work of the organization of the markets in sugar; 
- common customs tariff duties and other duties established or to be 
established by the institutions of the Communities in respect of trade 
with non-member countries. 
(d) Moreover, the heaviest taxes in the economy - VAT, taxes on energy, 
transport, revenue from transferable securities, and the main excise duties 
have to be harmonized in order to abolish refunds and levies within the 
Community and to arrive at Economic and Monetary Union, which has to be 
achieved in seven years time. 
(e) These observations show that although power over fiscal revenue on the 
national territory remains a valid notion, it is no longer absolute and, in 
the medium term, will become even less so. 
Nevertheless, in your rapporteur's opinion, this point deserves 
consideration and could justify the formulation of a second working 
assumption concerning the establishment of new resources for the 
Communities, 
17. The second proposed solution is to amend Article 4 (1) of the 
Council decision of 21 April 1970 'on the replacement of financial 
contributions from Member States by the Communities' own resources'. 
It would be sufficient to add, after sub-paragraph 2, which states 
that the annual rate of VAT accruing to the Communities and 'fixed within 
the framework of the budgetary procedure' may not exceed one per cent, a 
further sub-paragraph worded as follows: 
'HCJWever, on a proposal from the Commission, and in agreement with 
the Council acting unanimously, the Assembly may, acting by a majority of 
its members, adopt a rate higher than one percent but not exceeding two 
percent.• 
18. This would give a three-fold system: 
up to a VAT rate of one percent, the decision would be taken within the 
normal framework of the budgetary procedure (unchanged), 
above 1% but below 2%, the decision would require unanimity in the 
Council and a majority of one half plus one of the members of the 
Assembly, 
- 21 - PE 33.890/fin. 
above 2% the procedure laid down in article 201 would remain the same 
'after consulting the Assembly the Council may, acting unanimously, lay 
down the appropriate provisions, which it shall recommend to the Member 
States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements' . 
19. It should be noted that Article 201 will in any case have to be 
modified: 
subparagraph 1 is now outdated inasmuch as it treats a measure which 
has already been formally achieved as a future possibility: 
'which the financial contributions of Member States provided for in 
Article 200 could be replaced by the Communities own resources, in 
particular by revenue accruing from the common customs tariff when it 
has finally been introduced.' 
sub-paragraph 3 should also be modified, the formula 'after receiving 
the assent of the Assembly' replacing the expression 'after consulting 
the Assembly' . 
While it was sufficient merely to obtain the opinion of the Assembly 
before the system of own resources was introduced, the creation of new 
common resources within this system, requires the agreement of the 
Assembly. 
In the second assumption, therefore, Article 201 should,be worded 
as follows: 
'The Commission shall examine the conditions under which new own 
resources may be allocated to the Communities and to this end shall 
submit proposals to the Council and Assembly. 
The Council shall examine, at least every five years, whether and in 
what manner the Communities' own resources should be increased. 
The Council, acting unanimously and after receiving the ass~nt of the 
Assembly, may lay down the provisions which it shall recommend to the 
Member States for adoption'. 
20. Admittedly, this second solution does not go as far as the'first and 
is intellectually less satisfying in as far as it does not settle the prin-
ciples of the problem of financial autonomy as we have defined it (cf. 
9 above). However, it may be more realistic at the present stage of 
European construction, and it does make it possible to maintain in a 
flexible and pragmatic manner, the de-facto financial autonomy of the 
Communities in the short and medium-term, and, probably, until 1980, i. e. 
until the achievement of Economic and Monetary Union, which will 
necessitate much further revision. 
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Conclusion 
21. Intellectually and politically, the first solution must be given 
our preference and we must continue to bear it in mind. 
However, since at present this solution seems premature, bearing in 
mind the state of Parliamentary opinion in certain Member States, the 
second formula should be adopted and would constitute an appreciable 
step forward. 
In the light of the Commission's proposals concerning the principle 
of five-yearly revision, this formula would, as a result of the 1970 
decisions, lead to a first adjustment in 1975, which would probably 
remain valid until 1980. 
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II. CREATION OF NEW EXPENDITURE 
=========================== 
A - Preliminary remarks 
22. In the first place it should be noted that hitherto the Council 
has decided on the Community's expenditure, without pa~ing too much 
attention to revenue consisting of the financial contributions which 
Member States had to pay under the Treaty of Rome. This is undoubtedly 
the reason why sometimes in the past decisions affecting expenditure 
were taken in a cavalier fashion, forecasts were inaccurate management 
haphazard, supervision inadequate, and fraud only too frequent. 
It is not difficult to find the culprits - we must all share the 
responsibility: 
the Council, for its frequent abuse of its absolute and monarchic 
power; 
the Commission, for its frequent mistakes, submissiveness and 
slackness; 
Parliament, for its,acceptance of defeat, whilst going through the 
motions of protest. 
23. A change in method is necessary owing to the introduction of the 
Community's own resources, because from 1975 onwards the acceptable 
level of expenditure should be governed by the estimates of revenue. 
It is quite true that borrowing can provide supplementary resources 
as the occasion demands; however, such resources should only be used 
for equipment and, possibly, research expenditure. Moreover, it is 
necessary to make sure that the medium-term financial prospects are 
such as to provide reasonable cover for the interest on borrowing without 
the need to create new own resources, at any rate until the Communities 
acquire the legal authority to increase their own resources. 
24. These inevitable - and probably salutary - constraints will force 
the Communities in the future, as they did the individual Member States 
in the past, to take greater care in drawing up budgetary estimates, 
implementing common policies and, above all, creating new expenditure. 
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B - The concept of new expenditure 
25. The concept of 'new expenditure' merits explanation. 
It would appear that new expenditure is not created where existing 
regulations adopted in the normal course of events necessarily entail 
recourse to new appropriations. This applies, for example, to the export 
refunds provided for under the common agricultur~l policy, which may be 
affected by domestic price fixing and fluctuations in world market 
quotations. In such instances the Community has no option but to accept 
the budgetary consequences of the regulations it adopts, so that the 
budgetary entries must be regarded as estimates rather than as binding 
figures. 
The same is true of the effects of currency fluctuations on the 
amounts of compensatory payments. 
Another illustration is provided by the effects of salary and wage 
increases tied to rises in the cost of living and to career structures. 
All cases of the abovementioned type involve automatic increases 
in existing expenditure rather than the creation of new expenditure. 
26. Conversely, new expenditure is obviously created when it is decided 
to pursue a new common policy, resulting in charges upon the Communities. 
This is again the case when a decision is taken to recruit additional 
staff, 
New expenditure is also incurred in the case of actions subject to 
appropriation ceilings where it is decided to raise the ceiling (e.g. in 
connection with the Social Fund or food aid). 
27. It is more difficult to classify cases where expenditure is caused 
by derogations from common policy rules. 
Even where such measures are desirable from the standpoint of sound 
financial management, it would be unjustifiable to represent them as the 
unavoidable consequence of Community rules, since they in fact constitute 
a case of non-application of these rules. 
It appears, therefore, that such expenditure should be considered as 
new when it exceeds the level of normal management needs, at any rate 
when it entails a supplementary budget (e.g. sale of butter to the USSR), 
since such situations involve specific decisions, responsibility for 
which ought to be shared between the institutions. 
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C - Constitutional practice in relation to new expenditure 
28. In most Member States the recurring effects of existing regulations 
are not regarded as new expenditure and do not, as a rule, give rise to 
lengthy debate, except where the regulations themselve~ are considered 
to require amendment. 
On the other hand, new expenditure is always scrutinized with great 
care, indeed with distrust. 
In some countries, for example France, only the government may 
propose new expenditure. Elsewhere parliaments may take the initiative, 
but even in Germany the government may reject such measures, referring 
them back to the Assembly for a second reading (Art. 113 of the Basic Law). 
This is a well established and frequently encountered principle in 
parliamentary democracy. 
Broadly speaking, constitutions tend to stipulate agreement between 
parliament and the executive in the matter of expenditure. 
However, to the best of our knowledge parliament always has the last 
word on this subject, even where, as in France, the power of initiative 
is vested exclusively in the government. 
29. One cannot therefore be convinced, in the future era of financing from 
the Communities' own resources, by attempts to justify the continued 
omnipotence of the Council on the grounds of the special character of 
Community institutional law, since these powers could be justified solely 
and exceptionally by the system of national financial contributions. 
If we were to accept such a justification, the parliamentary oases 
of our Member States would stand in sharp contrast to the parliamentary 
vacuum at Community level. 
Such acceptance would, moreover, imply the application of an 
institutional principle totally opposed to that adopted by all the 
Member States, and hence unjustifiable. 
30. We ought, therefore, to admit the principle that the European 
Parliament, representing the people of the Community, should, from 1 
January 1975 have the last word on the creation of new expenditure, 
subject of course to conditions and procedures defined with due regard 
for the specific structures of the Community. 
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D - Solutions proposed 
31. The Conunission's proposals in this respect are inadequate, since 
they provide no assurance that, even under certain difficult conditions, 
Parliament will have the final say on new expenditure. 
On the one hand the Conunission suggests a second-reading procedure 
to be applied 'in the case of all decisions of principle having considerable 
financial effects over a period covered by several budgets', and concludes 
that 'without any modification of the general pattern of European 
construction, Parliament would thus be sure of being associated with the 
preparation of decisions determining the major annual budget items, and, 
above all, those reflecting Conununity policies. Parliament will thus 
be sure of being in a position to express its opinion publicly on all 
those policies' • 
Unfortunately, it must be pointed out that: 
(1) these proposals do not change the purely consultative nature 
of parliament's powers in this field: 
(2) parliament's existing consultative powers already allow it 
. to express its opinion publicly on Conununity policy: 
(3) these proposals constit.ute scarcely any advance on those 
contained in various exchanges of correspondence dated 
11 November 1969, 20 March 1970, 22 July 1970 and 31 October 
1972 on collaboration between Parliament and the Council on 
'acts having financial implications': 
(4) the proposals in fact appreciably restrict the scope covered 
by this correspondence, for 'acts having financial implications' 
consist not only of multi-year decisions, b~t also of 
temporary and ad hoe measures. 
32. It is true that on page 5, paragraph (c), referring to the budgetary 
procedure and in particular to Article 203, the Conunission, expressing 
its satisfaction at the fact that Parliament has the last word with regard 
to the approval of certain expenditure, 'reconunends that this category 
of expenditu~e should gradually be extended to include all expenditure 
which does not result automatically from previous long term decisions'. 
We shall consider these constructive and dynamic proposals in that part 
of the report which deals with budgetary procedure. 
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33. The proposals concerning the creation of new procedures are set out 
in the working document annexed to this report. 
According to these proposals, the financial element of acts having 
budgetary implications would be decided by the Assembly and the Council, 
and the procedure could consist of three stages: 
(a) In the first stage, the Commission forwards its proposals, together 
with a financial statement, to Parliament and the Council. Parliament 
expresses its opinion and forwards its resolution to the Council and the 
Commission. If the Council makes no modifications, the procedure is 
completed. 
In the event of disagreement, the second and third stages become 
obligatory. 
(b) The second stage consists of a conciliation procedur~. The Council, 
Parliament, and the Conunission as political institutions concerned with 
the preparation of the budget, appoint a number of persons to a 
Conciliation Committee which is convened within two weeks and must try 
to reach a solution by conciliation. 
(c) If the conciliation procedure is unsuccessful, either because the 
Conciliation Committee does not reach agreement or because the Assembly 
or the Council do not accept the Conciliation Conunittee's proposals, 
the Assembly and the Council have 30 days in which to define their final 
positions. 
The final word rests with: 
- the Assembly acting by a majority of one-half plus one of its members, 
unless the Council acts by a qualified majority; 
- the Assembly, unless the Council acts unanimously, if the Commission 
and the Assembly are in agreement or if the Assembly acts by a majority 
of one-half plus one of its members and of two-thirds of the votes cast; 
- ultimately, the Assembly, if it acts by a majority of one-half plus 
one of its members and of three-quarters of the votes cast. 
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34. The importance of the provisions adopted for the creation of new 
expenditure is clear from the following: depending on the extent of the real 
power granted to Parliament, in one form or another, in connection with 
the creation of new expenditure, Parliament's powers will have to be 
greater or smaller and involve a varying degree of compulsion in the budgetary 
procedure. 
It is reasonable to consider budgetary power as a whole and as a single 
entity. 
If Parliament is given satisfactory power in the formation of Community 
decisions producing recurrent expenditure, there will be no need for it to be 
able to call these decisions into question again through the budgetary 
procedure; if, on the other hand, it is not given real power in the formation 
of these decisions - on the pretext, for example, that they are essentially 
of a legislative nature - it will be normal for it to be able to contest them 
in budgetary debates, provided that the rights already acquired by third 
parties and the rules precluding retrospective effect are respected. 
Faced with this choice, real power at the moment of decision taking is 
definitely preferable to stronger powers within the budgetary procedure. 
35. If the Council and Parliament are to take joint decisions in this matter 
from 1975, it will be preferable for such decisions to be reached at the 
earliest possible stage in the procedure. 
Until legislative powers are granted to the Assembly, this -would avoid 
alternating and conflicting stages in which the final say would first rest 
with the Council - in establishing the basic regulations - and then with 
the Parliament in the budgetary debates. 
This would also prevent the budgetary debates becoming an opportunity for 
periodically calling into question the common policies through the annual 
vote of the corresponding expenditure. 
The balance between the institutions would become clearer and the common 
policies would gain in stability as a result. 
III. DISCUSSION AND ADOPTION OF THE BUDGET 
A. CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE 
(a) Preliminary note 
36. As indicated in paragraphs 13 and 14, the following proposals concerning 
the budgetary procedure are bound up with those governing the creation of 
new expenditure. 
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The proposals in this section are therefore to be considered together with 
those in the previous section (not, of course, in detail but in regard to the 
basic principle which consists in granting the European Parliament real power 
over new expenditure, as is normal in any parliamentary democracy). 
37. The provisions set out in paragraphs 39, 40 and 41 below could not apply 
if Parliament had no real power in the legislative stage whefe the basic 
decisions determining the bulk of the Conununity budget are taken. 
38. In this case, Parliament would have to demand the abolition of the 
arbitrary distinction between expenditure necessarily result~ng from the 
treaties and from acts adopted in accordance therewith and other expenditure, 
since all the expenditure of the Communities results from the' treaties or acts 
adopted in accordance therewith, including the administrative', expenditure which 
is just as essential as the other, and request a power of amendment over all 
expenditure, as defined in the new EEC Article 203 and in the:corresponding 
articles of the ECSC and EAEC treaties. 
In any event, this distinction must be removed at the latest when 
Parliament is given legislative power. 
(b) Proposals 
39. Subject to the .above remarks, the budgetary procedure must not provide 
a pretext for calling into question every year the operational poJ.icies which 
I 
require stability and which can only be annulled or modified by following the 
same procedures by which they were established. 
Conununity regulations also produce subjective rights for the benefit of 
legal or natural persons and the Communities cannot escape the ?udgetary 
consequences of these as long as their question regulations have not been 
properly amended. 
' 40. Annual appropriations resulting from the automatic and recurrent effects 
of established regulations must therefore be considered as oblig~tory and any 
reduction can only be symbolic and indicative. 
Otherwise, there would have to be a modification to the established 
regulation for the coming year; the effect of this would be compulsory in 
the legislative field. At the present stage, only an indicative reduction 
suggesting this modification without imposing it seems to be acceptable. 
41. For the future, and to the extent that its powers develop, the European 
Parliament must treat as established regulations all those properly adopt~d at 
the time, even if they might require more democratic procedures later. 
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42. Entries of supplementary expenditure (from one financial year to another) 
are of a different nature when they are not the automatic result of established 
regulations, but reflect a deliberate wish to extend the common policies in 
question by raising the annual ceiling of the corresponding appropriations. 
Here the executive retains the right to make a limited choice, on the 
basis of certain criteria, and within the set ceiling, of the operations or 
projects which are to benefit from the appropriations entered. 
The annual adjustment of these appropriations does not involve a 
modification of the current regulations, and therefore has no legislative 
implications. 
Nor do the regulations concerned automatically produce subjective rights 
for third parties1 such rights arise solely from the decision to apply the 
regulations for the benefit of one project or another. 
There is accordingly no problem here of the amount of the appropriations 
(i.e. a specifically budgetary problem): the corresponding expenditure 
cannot be considered as 'resulting necessarily from the treaties or from 
acts adopted in accordance therewith' and must therefore be subject to 
amendment by the Assembly. 
43. This conclusion ties in with the Commission's proposal referred to 
above recommending that the category of expenditure over which Parliament 
has the final say within the budgetary procedure should be progressively 
extended to all expenditure which does not result automatically from earlier 
long-term decisions. 
In this proposal the Commission adds that it will be guided by this 
principle in distinguishing between the two types of expenditure in submitting 
proposals and during budgetary debates. 
44. While thanking the Commission for this proposal, it seems desirable to 
call for a more immediate and more definite attitude on the basis of the 
above considerations in regard to the concept of new expenditure. 
The right of amendment is to be extended from 1 January 1975 to 
expenditure not automatically resulting from current regulations and the 
Council should be asked to approve this principle, since the fact that the 
Commission wishes to be guided by it in connection with proposals and bud-
getary debates does not provide any guarantee that it will in fact be followed. 
It should be noted that the Commission's proposals - like those of 
Parliament - require a modification to Article 203(8) to limit its application 
to administrative expenditure or expenditure arising from the functioning of 
the institutions as opposed to operational expenditure. 
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45. In future, the Commission, Parliament and Council should also ensure 
that the system of appropriation ceilings is applied as far as possible to 
operational expenditure necessitated by the new policies. 
46. The main argument in this respect is not the - tenporary - fact that 
Parliament has a greater budgetary power over such expenditure, since it 
seems clear that Parliament will in the near future be given legislative 
power and the distinction between 'amendments' and 'proposed modifications' 
will in practice be abolished. 
47. The main reason to be borne in mind is the need to avoid the 
establishment of 'automatic' systems which, once in operation, are not 
subject to the Commission's administrative responsibility ~d tend to pro-
liferate by themselves, so that, whoever the budgetary authorities are, all 
that remains for them to do is to take note of the results. 
The lack of any control over the budgetary development of an operational 
policy is always a serious shortcoming; above all it is incompatible with the 
system of own resources. 
48. New expenditure requested during the budgetary procedure is subject to 
the amendment procedure, since it is not yet the result of ':'the treaties or 
acts adopted in accordance therewith'. 
49. This is normally the case for all expenditure arising from the functioning 
of the institutions. 
For new expenditure relating to operational policies which, at the same 
time, falls within the sphere of applications of legislative power, the 
Commission and Council will therefore have a choice between ,the procedure 
proposed above for the legislative stage, and the amendment procedure which 
Parliament enjoys under Article 203 of the EEC Treaty. 
50. It should be noted that in distinguishing between the two categories of 
expenditure - expenditure arising out of Parliament's right of amendment and 
expenditure in respect of which it only has the right to propose modifications -
the criteria listed in the preceding paragraph must be taken into account and 
Parliament's agreement obtained. 
B. REJECTION OF THE DRAFT BUDGET 
51. Finally, the Parliament must reiterate its view and that of the 
Commission on the possibility of the Assembly rejecting the draft budget to 
elicit new proposals from the Council. 
Discussion of this question in the working party and Conunitbee on Budgets 
has revealed that it would be desirable for Parliament to be able to reject 
certain titles of the draft budget without rejecting the budget as a whole, 
so that it would not be necessary to employ a cumbersome procedure when its 
disagreement with the Council, although significant, ultimately refers only 
to certain titles in the draft budget. 
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52. As to the legal procedure forinplementing this possibility, it is 
proposed in the working document annexed to this report that it should be 
embodied in additional sub-paragraph 7a to Article 203 of the EEC Treaty. 
Clearly, however, Parliament would be satisfied if, without the Treaty 
being amended on this point, the Council, after discussing this matter, could 
reach an agreement with the two other institutions and endorse this by an 
exchange of letters or by any other appropriate procedure. 
C. BUDGETARY PROCEDURE 
53. The proposals from the Commission of the Communities on budgetary 
procedure accord with Parliament's wishes. 
54. This holds good e.g. for the provisions on the vote of appropriations in 
respect of proposals for modifications by the Assembly which do not increase 
the 'total expenditure' of an Ins::itution: the Commission proposes that the 
provision applicable during the interim period should be maintained, namely 
that the Council must have a qualified majority to reiect these proposals, 
while Article 203(5) of the Treaty provides that the Council must have a 
qualified majority to accept proposals for modifications. After all, 
Parliament's power in this area cannot be less after 1 January 1975 than it 
was before. 
55. On the other hand, in sub-paragraph 2 of paragraph Sa, the Commission 
suggests that if a proposal for a modification increases the total expenditure 
of an Institution, the Council should act by a qualified majority to accept 
this proposal. 
The ad hoe working party agreed with your rapporteur that: 
(1) a minority of the Council could not at the same time block a simple 
majority of both the Council and the Assembly; 
(2) the mere fact that a proposal was not accepted (possibly because 
it had not been considered) did not, in itself, constitute non-acceptance 
a rejection must be the result of a decision, even a decision by the lowest 
possible majority. 
It is therefore proposed that the Council should be able to reject these 
proposals for modifications entailing an increase in expenditure by a simple 
majority. 
56. As to revenue, it is essential that each Institution which examines the 
preliminary draft or draft budget should achieve a balance between expenditure 
and revenue. 
The percentage of revenue other than VAT cannot be changed in the course 
of the budgetary procedure for the reasons already explained above. The 
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balance of the budget must therefore be achieved by a specific proposal at 
each stage in the budgetary procedure in respect of the percentage proposed 
for the community VAT levy below the maximum rate. 
The working document therefore proposes amendments designed to impose 
this obligation on each Institution and at each stage of the procedure. 
57. It will therefore be noted that Article 203(8) of the EEC Treaty con-
cerning the replacement of financial contributions from the Member States 
by the Communities' own resources should be amended so that from 1 January 1975 
new categories of operational expenditure will be subject to the Parliament's 
right of amendment. 
In fact, this paragraph sets out a list of statistical coefficients 
designed to limit increases in 'Community expenditure other than that 
necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance 
therewith .... '. Clearly this definition was intended to limit administrative 
expenditure and, in more general terms, the expenditure arising from the 
functioning of the Community Institutions: it could not be applied as such to 
operational expenditure for which the maximum is fixed annually, such as food 
aid, the Social Fund etc. 
The phrase: 
'for all expenditure other than that necessarily resulting from this Treaty 
or from acts adopted in accordance therewith, a maximum rate 
should therefore be replaced by: 
'for all expenditure entailed by the functioning of the Co~unity 
institutions, a maximum rate .... '. 
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IV. SUPERVISION OF IMPLEMENTATION 
58. Budgetary power is basically a power of decision and Parliament 
cannot be confined to raece supervisory powers. 
Without the power to say how appropriations are to be spent an 
institution would have much less interest in knowing how they are being 
spent. 
59. The value of supervision is reduced if the institution which undertakes 
it has no real budgetary power, since the main purpose of supervision is 
not punitive but constructive: it must assist the budgetary authority - as 
well as the authority under supervision - to correct the errors which may 
sometimes arise from budgetary decisions. 
60. One might also wonder what the use would be of an institution giving a 
discharge on a budget which basically reflects the decisions of other 
institutions; it is up to those who have made the decisions to say whether 
their instructions have been understood and acted upon, and their decisions 
correctly implemented. 
The right of supervision is, logically speaking, only a derived right. 
61. Thus the increase in the Parliament's supervisory powers and the 
evolution of measures to promote such powers do not really compensate the 
Parliament for the inadequacy of its rights in other respects. 
62. On the contrary, if it is granted real powers of decision it must 
attach even more importance to its powers and means of supervision, since 
its budgetary powers themselves would be less effective, if its intentions 
could, wth impunity, be ignored in the implementation of the budget. 
63. With this in mind, Parliament has often called for means of supervision 
in the Communities to be strengthened, and the Committee on Budgets has had 
consultations with the Presidents of the Member States' audit offices; these 
have led to the formation of a joint working party to formulate ideas on a 
possible European Court of Auditors. 
The Parliament therefore welcomes the Commission's proposals for the 
establishment of such an institution. 
It seems, however, that certain improvements could be made, in 
particular: 
- the members of the Court of Auditors should be completely independent 
and should be appointed in agreement with Parliament; 
- the Court should report to Parliament and be available to assist and 
advise it in its supervisory duties. 
64. Lastly, the Parliament welcomes the fact that the Commission concludes 
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its proposals on this matter by stating that Parliament alone, on a 
recommendation from the Council, should have the right to give a discharge 
on the budget. 
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NOTES 
65. A working document, annexed to this report, which was discussed but not 
voted on by the working party and the committees responsible, was drawn up at 
the responsibility of your rapporteur to set out clearly the main suggestions 
contained in this report. 
Your rapporteur hopes that it will help to clarify a subject which is 
complex but has a vital bearing on the effective functioning of the Community 
institutions. 
66. It should also be stressed that the various proposals contained in this 
report form a whole; it was, however, felt advisable for separate proposals 
to be made on the different chapters although they are all inter-related. 
The connection between the creation of new expenditure and the rules of 
budgetary procedure should be particularly emphasized, as should the fact that 
the right of supervision is insignificant in itself, but assumes great 
importance as a complement to actual budgetary powers • 
•••••• AND CONCLUSIONS 
67. In asking the Commission to take full account of the resolution which is 
to be adopted and in urging the Council not to adopt its proposals without 
first consulting Parliament, Parliament must emphasize once again that it 
cannot endorse any proposal which, when the own resources system is introduced, 
fails to grant real budgetary power to the only institution which represents 
the peoples of the Community at this level. 
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WORKING DOCUMENT 
drawn up by the rapporteur 
on 
I - The establishment of new own resources for the Communities; 
II - The strengthening of the budgetary powers of the European 
Parliament; 
III - The setting-up of a Court of Auditors of the European Communities 
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1969 Proposals from the Commission Texts in force 
I. - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW OWN RESOURCES FOR THE COMMUNITIES 
Sole Article 
From 1 January 1974, the foll-
owing provisions are substituted for 
Article 201 of the EEC Treaty: 
'The Commission shall examine 
the conditions under which resources 
could be assigned to the Communities 
from the fiscal revenue of Member 
States, particularly revenue accru-
ing from harmonized taxes, or be 
raised from direct or indirect taxes 
introduced for the benefit of the 
Community. 
The Assembly, acting on a prop-
osal from the Commission, and after 
receiving the assent of the Council 
acting unanimously, may make prov-
ision for new resources for the 
Community or amend the assessment 
basis for the Community'.s existing 
resources, acting by a majority of 
its members and of two-thirds of 
the votes cast'. 
Article_20l_of_the_Treaty 1 
The Commission shall examine the 
conditions under which the financial 
contributions of the Member States 
provided for in Article 200 could be 
replaced by the Community's own re-
sources, in particular by revenue 
accruing from the Common Customs Tar-
iff when it has finally, been intro-
duced. 
To this end, the Commission shall 
submit proposals to th~ Council. 
After consulting the Assembly 
on these proposals the Council may, 
acting unanimously, lay down the 
appropriate provisions., which it shall 
recommend to the Member States for 
adoption in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
1 See also decision of 21 April 1970 establishing own resources for the 
Communities. This decision was ratified ~y Member ·states at the same 
time as the Treaty of 22 April 1970. · 
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1973 Proposals from the Commission 
Article 1 
The following provisions are 
substituted for Article 201 of the 
Treaty establishing the European 
Economic community: 
'The Commission shall examine 
in what manner the Community's own 
resources could be raised either 
from the fiscal revenue of the 
Member States, particularly revenue 
accruing from harmonized taxes, or 
from direct or indirect taxes intro-
duced for the benefit of the 
Community. 
In every fifth year the Council, 
after receiving a report from the 
Commission and consulting the Assembly, 
shall examine whether and in what 
manner new resources should be intro-
duced for the Community. 
The council, acting on a proposal 
from the Commission and by agreement 
with the Assembly, may make provision 
for new resources for the Community 
or amend the assessment basis for the 
Community's existing resources. The 
Council shall act unanimously and the 
Assembly by a majority of its members 
and of three-fifths of the votes cast. 
Working assumptions 
Article 1 
unchanged 
The Commission shall examine 
the conditions under which new own 
resources may be assigned to the 
Communities, and to this end shall 
submit proposals to the Council and 
the Parliament. 
In at least every fifth year the 
council, after receiving a report 
from ~he Commission and consulting 
the Assembly, shall examine whether 
and in what manner new resources 
should be introduced for the 
Community. 
From 1 January 1975 1 the cost of 
common policies will in any case have 
to be met for the medium term. If 
necessary, therefore, the annual 
percentage of VAT assigned to the 
Community must be fixed by the Parlia-
ment at between 1 and 2%, on a pro-
posal from the Commission and with the 
unanimous agreement of the Council. 
The Assembly, on a proposal from 
the Commission and in agreement with 
the Council acting unanimously, wi.1,1 b~ 
able, acting by a majority of its members 
and of three-fifths of the votes cast, to 
modify the existing level of own 
resources or establish new resources. 
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Decision of the Council of 21 April 
1970 on the replacement of financial 
contributions from Member States by 
the Communities' own resources. 
Article 4 (1), sub paras. 1, 2 and 3 
1. From 1 January 1975 the budget of 
the Communities shall, irrespective of 
other revenue, be financed entirely 
from the Communities' own resources. 
Such resources shall include those 
referred to in Arti.cle 2 and also those 
accruing from the value added tax and 
' 
obtained by applying a rate not exceed-
ing 1% to an assessment basis which is 
determined in a uniform manner for Mem-
ber States according to Community Rules. 
The rate shall be fixed within the frame-
work of the budgetary ~rocedure. If 
at the beginning of a ,financial year 
the budget has not yet been adopted, 
the rate previously fixed shall remain 
applicable until the entry into force 
of a new rate. 
However, during the period 
between l January 1975 and 31 
December 1977 ....... . 
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1973 Proposals from the Commission Working Assumptions 
Article 4 (1) 
Paras. 1 and 2 unchanged 
After_eara._2,_add_a_further~ara. 
worded_as_follows: 
However, the Assembly may, act-
ing on a proposal from the Commission 
and with the unanimous assent of the 
Council, and by a majority of its 
1 
members adopt a rate of between 1% 
and 2%. 
During the period 1 January 1975 
to 31 December 1977, the variation 
from year to year in the share of each 
Member State in relation to the pre-
ceding year may not, in any circum-
stances, exceed 2%. Should this per-
centage be exceeded, the necessary 
adjustment shall be made, within that 
variation limit, by financial compen-
sation between the Member States con-
cerned in proportion to the share borne 
by each of them in respect of the 
revenue accruing from value added tax 
or from the financial contribution 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3. 
1 'Majority of its members' shall be understood to denote duly appointed 
Members who have not tendered their resignation. 
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1969 Proposals from the Commission Texts in force 
II. THE STRENGTHENING OF THE BUDGETARY POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Acts having financial implications 
None 
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Resolution No. 2 annexed to the 
Treaty of 22 April 1970. 
In order to provide the European 
Parliament with such information as 
will enable it to give its opinion 
on Community acts having financial 
implications, the Council shall 
invite the Commission to append to 
the proposals which it forwards to 
the European Parliament estimates 
of the financial implications of 
those acts. 
This resolution was followed 
by implementing measures established 
by joint agreement between Parliament 
and the Council (15 November 1972). 
This agreement provides for 3 
stages: 
- cooperation before the Assembly 
gives its opinioni 
- cooperation after the Assembly 
has given its opinion and before 
the Council takes its decisioni 
- procedure to be followed after 
the Council has taken its decision, 
if it has departed from the opinion 
of the Assembly. 
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The commission of the communities 
makes no formal proposals but, in the 
introduction to its proposals on 
budgetary powers, it states: 
(a) The major part of budgetary 
expenditure is incurred pursuant to 
decisions of principle and other 
multi-year commitments adopted by the 
council. In accordance with the spirit 
of cooperation desired between the 
institutions it is essential that 
Parliament should be associated with 
the thinking and discussion leading 
up to the final adoption of such 
decisions and commitments by the 
council. 
Under the procedures laid down 
by the Treaties, the Parliament has 
to be consulted in a large number of 
cases. Furthermore the Commission 
has suggested a 'second reading' 
procedure for important rule-making 
decisions of general application. 
The latter procedure should therefore 
be applied in the case of all decisions 
of principle having considerable 
financial effects over a period covered 
by several budgets. If, for example, 
new, permanent machinery for financial 
intervention were to be set up 
tomorrow, a second reading would have 
to be arranged each time the council 
wished to depart markedly from the 
opinion given by the Parliament upon 
the first reading. Naturally the 
commission undertakes to re-examine its 
own position each time the second read-
ing procedure is applied. 
Without modification of the 
general pattern of European con-
struction, Parliament would thus be 
sure of being associated with the 
preparation of decisions determining 
the major annual budget items and, 
above all, those reflecting community 
policies. Parliament will thus be sure 
of being in a position to express its 
opinion publicly on all those policies. 
Working assumptions 
The financial element of acts 
having budgetary implications shall 
be decided by the Assembly and the 
Council. Depending on the case, 
the procedure shall consist of one, 
two or three stages: 
- one stage if there is agreement 
between the institutions; 
- two stages if there is disagreement 
and this disagreement can be 
settled by the coordination 
procedure; 
- three stages if coordination fails. 
First stage (agreement between the 
institutions) 
(a) The Commission shall forward its 
proposals, together with a 
financial statement, to Parlia-
ment and the Council. 
(b) Parliament shall express its 
opinion and forward its resolu-
tion to the council and the 
Commission. 
(c) If Parliament has made any 
modifications to the initial 
proposal, the Commission must 
inform Parliament and the council 
whether it will modify its 
proposals or not. 
(d) The Council shall deliberate 
and, if it makes no modifi-
cations to the text approved 
by Parliament, the procedure is 
completed. 
(e) If the Council modifies the text 
approved by Parliament, the 
Commission must say, at the 
Council sitting, whether these 
modifications are of a substan-
tial nature. 
If they are not, the text 
may be promulgated immediately 
and the Commission shall inform 
Parliament. 
If the reverse is the case, 
the coordination stage comes into 
operation. 
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working assumptions 
Second atage (coqrdination 
procedure) 
After fixing the date in agree-
ment with the President of the 
Council and the President of the Par-
liament the commission shall 
within two weeks convene the 
Coordination Council. · 
This · Council shall consist 
of the Presidents of the Parliament, 
the Council, the Commission and the 
Court of Justice, who may be aoaom-
panied or represented by members of 
their respective· institutions. 
The conclusions of the Council 
shall immediately be submitted 
to the Parliament and the 
Council (and the Commission}, who 
may approve them within 15 days. 
If the Council reaches a unani-
mous agreement, the Parliament 
may accept its conclusions by a 
majority of its members and the 
Council by a qualified majority. 
Third stage 
If the Council does not 
reach a unanimous agreement or if 
its unanimous conclusions are not 
accepted by the Parliament, the 
Council (and the Commission), the Par-
liament and the council have 30 
days in which to define their final 
positions. Three possibilities 
then arise: 
- in the end the final word will rest 
with the Parliament 'if it acts 
by a majority of one half plus 
one of its members, unless the 
Council acts by a qualified 
majority. 
- the final word will also rest with 
the Parliament if the Commission 
and the P.arliament are in agreement 
of it the Parliament acts by a 
majority of one half plus one of 
its members and of two-thirds of 
the votes cast, unless the Council 
acts unanimously. 
- the final decision will be vested 
in the Parliament if it acts by a 
majority of one half plus one of 
its members and of three-quarters 
of the votes cast. 
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Budgetary procedure 
Article 203 
Text in force 
Article 203 
1. The financial year shall run 1. The financial year shall run 
from 1 January to 31 December. from 1 January to 31 December. 
2. Each institution of the Conununity 2. 
shall draw up estimates of its 
expenditure. On the basis of 
Each institution of the 
Conununity shall, before 1 July, 
draw up estimates of its 
expenditure. The Conunission 
shall consolidate these 
estimates in a preliminary 
draft budget. I.t shall attach 
thereto an opinion which may 
contain different estimates. 
these estimates the conunission 
shall draw up the draft budget 
after consulting the other 
institutions or organs concerned 
whenever it intends to depart 
from their estimates. The draft 
budget shall be accompanied by an 
explanatory memorandum. The preliminary draft budget 
shall contain an estimate of 
revenue and .an estimate of 
expendi tur~ ~ 
3. The Assembly, acting by a majority 3. 
of its members, shall have the 
The Conunission shall place the 
preliminary draft budget 
before the council not later 
than 1 September of the year 
preceding that in which the 
budget is to be implemented. 
right to modify the draft budget, 
subject to the proviso that the 
total amount of expenditure may 
be increased only with the 
Conunission's agreement. 
The draft budget shall be placed 
before the Assembly and the Council 
not later than 31 August of the year 
preceding that in which the budget 
is to be implemented. 
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The council shall consult the 
Conunission, and, where appro-
priate, the other institutions 
concerned whenever it intends 
to depart from the preliminary 
draft budget. 
The Council shall, acting by a 
qualified majority, establish 
the draft budget and forward 
it to the Assembly. 
4. The draft budget shall be placed 
before the Assembly not later than 
5 October of the year preceding 
that in which the budget is to be 
implemented. 
The Assembly shall have the right 
to amend the draft budget, acting 
by a majority of its members, and 
to propose to·the Council, acting 
by an absolute majority of the 
votes cast, modifications to the 
draft budget relating to expenditure 
.necessarily resulting from this 
Treaty or from acts adopted in 
accordance therewith. 
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Article 203 
1. Unchanged. 
2. Unchanged. 
3. Unchanged. 
4. Unchanged. 
Unchanged. 
Working assumption 
Article 203 
1. Unchanged. 
2. Each of the institutions shall, 
before 1 July, draw up estimates 
of its expenditure. The 
Commission shall consolidate 
these estimates in a preliminary 
draft budget. It shall attach 
thereto an opinion which may 
contain different estimates. 
The budgetary consequences of 
decisions concerning Community 
measures shall be shown in an 
~-
This preliminary draft budget 
shall contain an estimate of 
revenue and particularly a pre-
liminary proposal concerning the 
percentage of VAT, together with 
an estimate of expenditure. 
The Commission shall submit its 
preliminary proposal on the 
percentage of VAT to the 
Governments and Parliaments of 
the Member States. 
3. Unchanged (sub-paragraphs 1 & 2) 
The Council shall, acting by a 
qualified majority, establish 
the draft budget, which shall 
contain a draft decision fixing 
the percentage of VAT, and 
forward it to the Assembly. 
4. The draft budget shall be placed 
before the Assembly not later than 
5 October of the year preceding 
that in which the budget is to be 
implemented. 
The Assembly shall have the right 
to amend the draft budgetl, 
acting by a majority of its 
members, and to propose to the 
Council, acting by an absolute 
majority of the votes cast, 
modifications to the draft budget 
relating to expenditure necessarily 
resulting from the Treaty or from 
acts adopted in accordance there-
with. The Assembly shall accordingly 
adopt a draft decision fixing the 
percentage of VAT·v 
1 The rapporteur welcomes the Commission's undertaking to include in 
the category of expenditure subject to amendment all expenditure not 
arising automatically from previous decisions with long-term 
implications. 
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4(a) If, within one month of the draft 
budget being placed before it, 
the Assembly has made no modifi-
cations, the draft budget shall 
be deemed to b~ finally adopted 
by the Assembly and shall be 
forwarded to the Council and 
Commission. 
If, within the period referred 
to in the preceding paragraph, 
the Assembly has made modifi-
cations to the draft budget, the 
draft budget so modified shall be 
forwarded to the council and 
Commission. 
The draft budget forwarded by the 
Assembly shall be deemed to be 
finally adopted unless within one 
month of receipt the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, 
proposes amendments. 
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Text in force 
If, within 45 days of the 
draft budget being placed 
before it, the Assembly has 
given its approval, the 
budget shall stand as finally 
adopted. If within this 
period the Assembly has not 
amended the draft budget 
nor proposed any modifications 
thereto, the budget shall be 
deemed to be finally adopted. 
If within this period the 
Assembly has adopted amendments 
or proposed modifications, the 
draft budget together with the 
amendments or proposed modifi-
cations shall be forwarded to 
the Council. 
5. After discussing the draft 
budget with the Commission and, 
where appropriate, with the 
other institutions concerned, 
the Council may, acting by a 
qualified majority modify any 
of the amendments adopted by 
the Assembly and shall pronounce, 
also by a qualified majority, on 
the modifications proposed by the 
latter. The draft budget shall 
be modified on the basis of the 
proposed modifications accepted 
by the council. 
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Unchanged 
Unchanged 
s. After discussing the draft budget 
with the Commission and, where 
appropriate, with the other 
institutions concerned, the 
Council may, acting by a 
qualified majority modify any 
of the amendments adopted by 
the Assembly and shall pronounce 
on the modifications proposed by 
the latter in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 5 (a). 
1 S(a) Where a proposal for a modification 
presented by the Assembly does not 
have the effect of increasing the 
total amount of the expenditure 
of an institution, owing in 
particular to the fact that the 
increase in expenditure which it 
would involve would be expressly 
compensated by one or more 
proposed modifications correspond-
ingly reducing expenditure, the 
Council may, acting by a qualified 
majority, reject the proposed 
modification. In the absence of a 
decision to reject it, the proposed 
modification shall stand as 
accepted. 
Where a proposal for a modification 
presented by the Assembly has the 
effect of increasing the total 
amount of the expenditure of an 
institution the council must act 
by a qualified majority in 
accepting the proposed modifi-
cation. 
Working assumptions 
If, within 45 days of the draft 
budget being placed before it, the 
Assembly has given its approval, 
the budget shall stand as finally 
adopted. If within this period the 
Assembly has not amended the draft 
budget nor proposed any modifi-
cations thereto, the budget shall 
be deemed to be finally adopted. 
The Assembly shall accordingly 
adopt the decision concerning the 
percentage of VAT. 
Unchanged 
Unchanged 
S(a) Where a p~oposal for a modifi-
cation presented by the Assembly 
does not have the effect of 
increasing the total amount of 
the expenditure of an institution, 
owing in particular to the fact 
that the increase in expenditure 
which it would involve would be 
expressly compensated by one or 
more proposed modifications cor-
respondingly reducing expenditure, 
the Council may, · acting by a 
qualified majority, reject the 
proposed modification. In the 
absence of a decision to reject 
it, the proposed modification 
shall be deemed to be accepted. 
Where a proposal for a modi-
fication presented by the 
Assembly has the effect of 
increasing the total amount 
of the expenditure of an 
institution, the Council may~ 
acting by a majority,reject the 
proposed modification. In the 
absence of a decision to reject 
it, the proposal shall be deemed 
to be accepted, 
l The provisions of paragraph Sb are taken from Article 203 a, applicable 
during the period 1971-1974. 
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If the council proposes modifi-
cations, the President of the Assembly 
shall immediately convene a Conciliation 
Committee consisting of the presidents 
of the Assembly, Council, Commission and 
court of Justice, who may be accompanied 
or represented by members of their 
respective institutions. 
The Conciliation Committee shall 
Text in force 
If, within 15 days of the 
draft budget being placed before it, 
the Council has not modified any of 
the amendments adopted by the 
Assembly and has accepted the modi-
fications proposed by the latter, 
the budget shall be deemed to be 
finally adopted. The Council shall 
inform the Assembly that it has not 
modified any of the amendments and 
has accepted the proposed modifi-
cations. 
give its opinion within 15 days of being 
convened, after hearing, where appropriate, 
the representatives of the Economic and 
Social Committee. 
(b) If the Conciliation Committee reaches 
unanimous agreement on the amendments to 
be made to the draft budget, its con-
clusions shall be immediately submitted 
to the Assembly, council and Commission, 
which may adopt them within 15 days. The 
Assembly shall act by a majority of its 
members and the Council by a qualified 
majority. ·· 
The draft budget so amended shall be 
deemed to be finally adopted. 
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Where, in pursuance of the first 
or second sub-paragraphs of this 
paragraph, the Council has rejected 
or has not accepted a proposed mod-
ification, it may, acting by a 
qualified majority, either retain the 
amount shown in the draft budget or 
fix another amount. 
5(b) If within 15 days of the draft 
budget being placed before it, 
the Council has not modified any 
of the amendments adopted by the 
Assembly or if the modifications 
proposed by the latter have been 
accepted, the budget shall be 
deemed to be finally accepted. 
The Council shall inform the 
Assembly that it has not modified 
any of the amendments and has 
accepted the proposed modifi-
cations. 
Working assumptions 
Where, in pursuance of the 
first or second sub-paragraphs of 
this paragraph, a proposed modifi-
cation has been rej ecte~ the Council 
may, acting by a qualified majority, 
either retain the amount shown in 
the draft budget or fix another 
amount. 
5(b) If within 15 days of the draft 
budget being placed before it, 
the Council has not modified 
any of the amendments adopted 
by the Assembly or if the 
modifications proposed by the 
latter have not been rejected, 
the budget shall be deemed to 
be. finally accepted. The 
~ouQ~il shall inform the 
A~sernbly that it has not modi-
fied any of the amendments and 
that the proposed modifications 
have been accepted. 
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(c) If the Conciliation Committee does 
not reach unanimous agreement or if its 
unanimous conclusions are not approved 
by the Assembly, Council and Conunission, 
each amendment proposed by the Council 
shall be deemed to be finally adopted 
unless within 20 days of receipt of the 
Conciliation Conunittee's opinion or of 
expiry of the period referred to in (b) 
above, it is rejected by the Assembly, 
acting by a majority of two-thirds of the 
votes cast and a majority of its members. 
Text in force 
If within this period the 
council has modified one or more of 
the amendments adopted by the 
Assembly or has not accepted the 
modifications proposed by the latter, 
the draft budget shall again be 
forwarded to the Assembly. The 
Council shall inform. the Assembly 
of the results of its deliberations. 
6. Within 15 days of the budget 
being placed before it, the 
Assembly, which shall have been 
notified of the action taken on 
its proposed modifications, 
shall act, by a majority of its 
members and of three-fifths of 
the votes cast, on the modifi-
cations to its amendments made 
by the Council, and shall adopt 
the budget accordingly. If 
within this period the Assembly 
has not acted, the budget shall 
be deemed to be finally adopted. 
The draft budget shall be deemed 7. When the procedure provided for 
in this article has been 
completed the President of the 
Assembly shall declare that the 
budget has been finally adopted. 
to be finally adopted when modifications 
made to it have been adopted in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
preceding paragraph. 
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If, within this period, the Council 
has modified one or more of the amend-
ments adopted by the Assembly or if the 
modifications proposed by the latter 
have not been accepted, the draft budget 
shall again be forwarded to the ARsembly. 
The council shall inform the Assembly 
of the results of its deliberations~ 
6. Unchanged 
7. Unchanged 
_. 54 _ 
Working assumptions 
If, within this period, the 
Council has modified one or more of 
the amendments adopted by the 
Assembly or if the modifications 
proposed by the latter have been 
rejected, the draft budget shall 
again be forwarded to the Assembly. 
The Council shall inform the 
Assembly of the results of its 
deliberations; 
6. 
7. 
7 (a) 
Within 15 days of the budget 
being placed before it, the 
Assembly, which shall have 
been notified of the action 
taken on its proposed modifi-
cations, shall act, by a 
majority of its members and 
of three-fifths of the votes 
cast on the modifications made 
by the Council to its amend-
ments and shall adopt the 
budget and the decision on the 
the percentage of VAT accord-
ingly. If within this period 
the Assembly has not acted, 
the budget containing the 
decision on the rate of VAT 
shall be deemed to be finally 
adopted. 
Unchanged 
However, the Assembly may, for 
important reasons, by a majority 
of one half plus one of its 
members and of two-thirds of the 
votes cast, reject the draft 
budget or certain titles of the 
draft budget, in order to per-
mit the Council to formulate new 
proposals. 
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8. A maximum rate of increase in 
relation to the expenditure of the 
same type to be incurred during 
the current year shall be fixed 
annually for the total expend-
iture other than that necessarily 
resulting from this Treaty or from 
acts adopted in accordance there-
with. · 
The Commission shall, after con-
sulting the Conjunctural Policy 
Committee and the Budgetary Policy 
committee, declare what this 
maximum rate is as it results from: 
- the trend, in terms of volume, 
of the gross national product 
within the Community1 
- the average variation in the 
budgets of the Member States1 and 
- the trend of the cost of living 
in the preceding financial year. 
The maximum rate shall be communi-
cated, before 1 May, to all the 
institutions of the community. The 
latter shall be required to conform to 
this during the budgetary procedure, 
subject to the provisions of the fourth 
and fifth sub-paragraphs of this para-
graph. If, in respect of expenditure 
other than that necessarily resulting 
from this Treaty or from acts adopted 
in accordance therewith, the actual 
rate of increase in the draft budget 
established by the Council is over half 
the maximum rate, the Assembly may, 
exercising its right of amendment, 
further increase the total amount of 
that expenditure to a limit not exceed-
ing half the maximum rate. 
Where, in exceptional cases, the 
Assembly, the council or the Commission 
considers that the activities of the 
Community require that the rate deter-
mined according to the procedure laid 
down in this paragraph should be 
exceeded, another rate may be fixed by 
agreement between the Council, actina 
by a qualified majority, and the Assem-
bly, acting by a majority of its members 
and of three-fifths of the votes cast. 
9. Each institution shall exercise the 
powers conferred upon it by this Article, 
with due regard for the provisions of 
this Treaty and for the acts adopted in 
accordance therewith, in particular 
those relating to the Communities' own 
resources and to the balance between 
revenue and expenditure. 
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Unchanged 
Working assumptions 
Q. For expenditure entailed by the 
functioning of the Institutions, 
a maximum rate of increase in 
relation to expenditure of the 
same nature incurred in the 
current financial year shall be 
fixed annually. 
Sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 unchanged. 
Where the Assembly, the council or Unchanged 
the Commission considers that the 
activities of the Communities require 
that the rate determined according to 
the procedure laid down in this· para-
graph should be exceeded, another rate 
may be fixed by agreement between the 
council, acting by a qualified majority, 
and the Assembly, acting by a majority 
of its members and of three-fifths of 
the votes cast. 
9. Unchanged 9. Unchanged 
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None 
None 
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Texts in force 
None 
Article 204 
If, at the beginning of a 
financial year, the budget has not 
yet been voted, a sum equivalent 
to not more than one-twelfth of the 
budget appropriations for the 
preceding financial year may be 
spent each month in respect of any 
chapter or sub-division of the 
budget in accordance with the 
provisions of the regulations made 
pursuant to Article 209; this 
arrangement shall not, however, 
have the effect of placing at the 
disposal of the Commission appro-
priations in excess of one-twelfth 
of those provided for in the draft 
budget in course of 'preparation. 
' The Council may, acting by a 
qualified majority, provided that 
the other conditions laid down in the 
first paragraph are observed, 
authorize expenditure in excess of 
one-twelfth. 
Member States shall pay every 
month, on a provisional basis and in 
accordance with the scales laid down 
for the preceding financial year, 
the amounts necessary to ensure 
application of this Article. 
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Article 3(203 b) 
The following provisions are added 
to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community: 
'Article 203 b 
Any decision to have recourse to 
the raising of loans shall be decided 
during the budgetary procedure by the 
Council acting by a qualified majority 
and by agreement with the Assembly'. 
(Article 204, paragraph 1) 
Unchanged 
Article 4 (204, paragraph 2) 
The following is added to Article 
204, paragraph 2 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic 
Communities: 
'If the decision relates to 
expenditure which does not necessarily 
result from the Treaty or from acts 
adopted in accordance therewith, the 
Council shall forward it immediately 
to the Assemblyr within 15 days the 
Assembly, acting by a majority of its 
members and of three-fifths of the 
votes cast, may adopt a different 
decision. The decision of the Council 
shall be suspended pending a decision 
by the Assembly or the expiry of the 
said period of 15 days.' 
(Unchanged) 
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Article 3 (203 b) 
Any decision to have recourse 
to the raising of loans shall be 
taken on a proposal from the 
Commission by the Council, acting 
by a qualified majority and in 
agreement with the Assembly, 
acting by half the number plus one 
of its members and by a majority of 
the votes cast. 
(Article 204, paragraph 1) 
If, at the beginning of a 
financial year, the budget or 
certain titles of the budget have 
not been ••• 
The remainder unchanged 
Article 4 (204, paragraph 2) 
Unchanged 
If the decision relates to 
expenditure which does not necessar-
ily result from the Treaty or from 
acts adopted in accordance there-
with, the Council shall forward it 
immediately to the Assembly, within 
30 days the Assembly, acting by a 
majority of its members and of 
three-fifths of the votes cast, may 
adopt a different decision. The 
decision of the Council shall be 
suspended pending a decision by the 
Assembly or the expiry of the said 
period of 30 days. 
Article 4 a (204, paragraph 3) 
The text of paragraph 3 of 
Article 204, is as follows: 
The Member States shall pay 
every month, on a provisional 
basis and in accordance with the 
relevant rules laid down in the 
Financial Regulations, the amount 
necessary to ensure application of 
this article. 
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Article 206 
The accounts of all revenue and 
expenditure shown in the budget shall 
be examined by an Audit Board con-
sisting of auditors whose independ-
ence is beyond doubt, one of whom 
l:hall be chairman. The Council shall, 
acting unanimously, determine the 
number of auditors. The auditors and 
the chairman of the Audit Board shall 
be appointed by the council, acting 
unanimously, for a period of 5 years. 
Their remuneration shall be determined 
by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority. 
The purpose of the audit, which 
shall be based on records and, if 
necessary, performed on the spot, shall 
be to establish that all revenue has 
been received and all expenditure incurred 
in a lawful and regular manner and that 
the financial management has been sound. 
After the close of each financial year, the 
Audit Board shall draw up a report, which 
shall be adopted by a majority of its 
members. 
The commission shall submit annually 
to the Council and to the Assembly the 
accounts of the preceding financial year 
relating to the implementation of the 
budget, together with the report of the 
Audit Board. The Commission shall also 
forward to them a financial statement of 
the assets and liabilities of the 
community. 
Texts in force 
Article 206 
Unchanged• 
Unchanged 
Unchanged 
The council,acting by a qualified 
majority, and the Assembly shall give a 
discharge to the Commission in respect 
of the implementation of the budget. 
The Council and the Assembly 
shall give a discharge to the 
Commission in respect of the 
implementation of the budget. To 
this end, the report of the Audit 
Board shall be examined in turn by 
the council which shall act by a 
qualified majority, and by the 
Assembly. The Commission shall 
stand discharged only after the 
Council and the Assembly have 
acted. 
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Article 5 (206) 
The following provisions are 
substituted for Article 206 of the 
Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Conununity: 
'The conunission shall submit 
annually to the Council and to the 
Assembly the accounts of the preceding 
financial year relating to the 
implementation of the budget. The 
Conunission shall also forward to them 
a financial statement of the assets 
and liabilities of the Community. 
The Assembly, acting upon a 
reconunendation from the Council, shall 
give a discharge to the Conunission in 
respect of the implementation of the 
budget. To this end, the report of 
the Court of Auditors of the European 
conununities,· together with the 
observations of the institutions, shall 
be examined in turn by the Council, 
which shall act by a qualified majority, 
and by the Assembly. 
The time limits for the submission 
of the accounts, the financial statements 
and the report of the Court of Auditors 
shall be laid down in the financial 
regulations. ' 
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Article 5 (206) 
Unchanged 
Unchanged 
Unchanged 
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None 
Texts in force 
Article 209 
The Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commi ss:i.on: 
(a) make financial regulations 
specifying in parti01lar the 
procedure to be adopted for 
establishing and implementing 
the budget and for presenting 
and auditing accounts; . 
(b) determine the methods and 
procedure whereby the contribu-
tions of Member States shall be 
· made available to the Commission; 
(c) lay down rules concerning the 
responsibility of authorizing 
officers and accounting officers 
and concerning appropriate 
arrangements for inspection. 
Arti9le 50(2) ECSC 
None The levies shall be assessed 
annually on the various products 
according to their ~verage value; 
the rate thereof sh'all not, however, 
exceed one percent unless previously 
authorized by the Council, acting by 
a two-thirds majority. The mode of 
assessment and collection shall be 
determined by a general decision of 
the High Authority taken after 
consulting the Councili cumulative 
imposition shall be avoided as far 
as possible. 
- 61 - PE 33.890/fin. /Ann. 
1973 Proposals from the commission 
Article 6 (209) 
Working assumptions 
Article 6 (209) 
The Council shall, acting unanim-
ously on a proposal from the commission 
and by agreement with the Assembly: 
The Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the 
commission and after receiving the 
assent of the Assembly: 
(a) unchanged 
(b) unchanged (b) determine the methods and 
procedure whereby the contri-
butions of Member States shall 
be made available to the 
Commission1 it shall also 
determine the methods and 
procedure whereby, in case of 
emergency, financial contri-
butions of Member States may, 
in exceptional and duly justified 
circumstances, be made available 
to the Commission in the form of 
advances from funds. 
(c) unchanged (c) unchanged 
Articles_7_to_l9_(Doc._124/73)_concernin2_the_erovisions_relatin2_to 
the_settin2_ue_of_a_court_of Auditors_are_dealt with_in_Part_III_of_this 
~ocument~J Afticles_B_to_l3_an~_lS_to_lB_of_t~e_Commission's_eroeosal 
_Doc._124_73 __ are not_guoted_s1nce_the~_are_s1me1~_a_reeetition_of 
Articles_l_to_6_exceet_that_the~_are_inserted_in_the_EAEC_and_ECSC_Treaties. 
Commi~~o~)r~l~~n~h:~r=~~si~0 t~~et~!~~sc~~u~r~!9~~oi~~o;f~s_from_the ________________ i ________________________________________ _ 
Article 14 
The following provisions are sub-
stituted for Article 50 (2) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community: 
'The levies shall be fixed by the High 
Authority with the assent of the Assembly. 
They shall be assessed annually on the 
various products according to their average 
value1 the rate thereof shall not, however, 
exceed one percent unless previously 
authorized by the Council acting by a two-
thirds majority. The mode of assessment 
and collection shall be determined after a 
general decision by the High Authority, 
taken after consulting the Council and with 
Article 14 
It is hoped that the Commission 
and Parliament will reach a 
'gentleman's agreement' on these 
provisions. 
the assent of the Assembly, cumulative 
imposition shall be avoided as far as possible'. 
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III. THE SETTING UP OF A COURT OF AUDITORS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
None 
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(Treaty establishing a single 
Council and a single Conunission of 
the European Communities) 
Article 22 , 
An Audit Board of the European 
Communities is hereby established. 
The Board shall take the place of the 
Audit Boards of the European Coal and 
Steel Conununity, the European Economic 
Community and the European Atomic 
Energy Conununity. It shall exercise, 
under the conditions laid down in the 
Treaties establishing the three 
conununities, the powers and juris-
diction conferred on those bodies by 
these Treaties. 
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Article 7 
The following Articles are 
substituted for Article 22 of the 
Treaty establishing a single council 
and a single Commission of the 
European Communities: 
'Article 22 
A court of Auditors of the 
European Communities is hereby 
established 
Article 22 a 
1. The Court of Auditors shall consist 
of nine members. 
The number of members of the Court 
of Auditors may be altered by the Council, 
acting unanimously and by agreement with 
the Assembly. 
2. The members of the Court of Auditors 
shall be chosen from amongst persons who 
act or have acted in a similar capacity 
and whose independence is beyond doubt. 
Only nationals of Member States may 
be members of the Court of Auditors. 
3. The members of the Court of Auditors 
shall be appointed by common accord of the 
Member States for a term of six years. 
The term of 9ffice of members of the Court 
of Auditors may be renewed. 
The members shall elect the President 
of the court of Auditors from among their 
number for a term of three years. He may 
be re-elected. 
4. The members of the Court of Auditors 
shall, in the general interests of the 
communities, be completely independent in 
the performance of their duties. 
In the performance of these duties, 
they shall neither seek nor take instruction~ 
from any Government nor from any other body. 
They shall refrain from any action incom-
patible with their duties. 
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Working assumptions 
Article 7 
unchanged 
Article 22 
unchanged 
Article 22 a 
unchanged 
unchanged 
3. The members of the Court of 
Auditors shall be appointed by 
the Council in agreement with 
Parliament, for a period of six 
years. Their term of office may 
be renewed. 
unchanged 
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5. The members of the Court of 
Auditors may not, during their term of 
office, engage in any other occupation, 
whether gainful or not. When entering 
upon their duties they shall give a 
solemn undertaking that, both during 
and after their term of office, they 
will respect the obligations arising 
therefrom and in particular their duty 
to behave with integrity and discretion 
as regards the acceptance, after they 
have ceased to hold office, of certain 
appointments or benefits. 
6. Apart from normal replacements, 
or death, the duties of a member of the 
Court of Auditors shall end when he 
resigns or is compulsorily relieved by 
a finding of the Court of Justice 
pursuant to paragraph 7. 
The vacancy thus caused shall be 
filled for the remainder of the 
member's term of office. The Council 
may, acting unanimously and by agree-
ment with the Assembly, decide that 
such a vacancy need not be filled. 
Save in the case of compulsory 
retirement under the provisions of 
paragraph 7, the members of the Court 
of Auditors shall remain in office 
until they have been replaced. 
7. A member of the Court of Auditors 
may be deprived of his office or of his 
right to a pension or other benefits in 
its stead only if the Court of Justice, 
on application by the Assembly, the 
Council or the Commission, finds that he 
no longer fulfils the requisite conditions 
or meets the obligations arising from his 
office. 
8. Article 6 of this Treaty and the 
provisions of the Protocol on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the 
European Communities applicable to the 
Judges of the Court of Justice shall 
apply also to the members of the Court 
of Auditors. 
Article 22 b 
The Court of Auditors shall act by 
a majority of the number of members 
provided for in Article 22 a. 
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Working assumptions 
unchanged 
unchanged 
unchanged 
unchanged 
Article 22 b 
unchanged 
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Article 22 c 
The court of Auditors shall examine 
the accounts of all the revenue and 
expenditure of the institutions of the 
Conununities entered in the budget. It 
shall also examine the accounts of all 
bodies set up by the Conununities in 
accordance with the relevant con-
stitutive instrument. 
The purpose of the audit, which 
Working assumptions 
Article 22 c 
unchanged 
unchanged 
shall be based on records and, if necessary, 
performed on the spot at the premises of 
the institutions of the Conununities and in 
the Member States shall be to establish 
that all revenue has been received and all 
expenditure incurred in a lawful and 
regular manner and that the financial 
nanagement has been sound. 
Without prejudice to its other duties 
laid down in its Statue or in the financial 
regulations, the Court of Auditors, after 
the close of each financial year, shall 
draw up a report. The report shall be 
unchanged 
sent to the institutions of the Conununities 
and published. 
Article 22 d 
The court of Auditors shall prepare 
a draft of its Statute. The Statute 
shall be adopted by the Council, acting 
unanimously and by agreement with the 
Assembly after having obtained the 
opinion of the Conunission. The Statute 
shall determine in particular the 
relation between the Court of Auditors 
and national bodies with equivalent 
functions, and its relations with the 
Assembly. 
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The Court of Auditors shall 
report to Parliament. It shall 
be at Parliament's disposal at 
all times to assist and advise 
it in the exercise of its powers 
of control. 
Article 22 d 
A provisional Statute shall 
be adopted by the Council, acting 
unanimoll'3ly and in agreement with 
the Assembly, on a proposal from 
the Conunission of the Conununities 
and after having obtained the 
opinion of the Audit Board. 
Within one year of its setting 
up, the Court of Auditors shall 
propose, by a majority of two-
thirds of its members that its 
Statute be revised. This Statute 
shall be adopted by the Council, 
acting unanimously and in agree-
ment with the Assembly after 
having obtained the opinion of the 
Conunission. The Statute shall 
determine in particular the re-
lations between the Court of 
Auditors and national bodies with 
equivalent functions, and its 
relations with the Assembly. 
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Article 19 
The. terms of office of the members 
of the Audit Board of the European Conun-
unities shall expire upon the date of 
appointment of the members of the Court 
of Auditors of the European conununities. 
The members of the Court of Auditors 
shall be appointed on the entry into 
force of the present Treaty. 
The Council, acting unanimously, 
shall settle the financial arrangements 
for those members of the Audit Board who, 
their terms of office having expired 
pursuant to the preceding sub-paragraph, 
are not appointed members of the Court 
of Auditors. 
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Article 19 
unchanged 
unchanged 
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Article 20 
This Treaty shall be ratified by 
the High contracting Parties in 
accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. The 
instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Government of the 
Italian Republic. 
Article 21 
This Treaty shall enter into 
force on the first day of the month 
following the deposit of the 
instrument of ratification by the 
last signatory state to take this step. 
If this Treaty enters into force 
during the budgetary procedure, the 
Council shall, after consulting the 
Commission, lay down the measures 
required in order to facilitate the 
application of this Treaty to the 
remainder of the budgetary procedure. 
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Article 20 
unchanged 
Article 21 
unchanged 
If this Treaty enters into 
force during the budgetary procedure, 
the Council shall, in agreement with 
Parliament and after consulting the 
Commission, lay down the measures 
req.iired in order to facilitate the 
application of this Treaty to the 
remainder of the budgetary procedure. 
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Opinion of the Political Affairs Conunittee 
Dr aft sman: Mr P. KIRK 
On 4 June 1973 the enlarged Bureau decided to instruct the Political 
Affairs Committee - as the conunittee responsible for all questions relat-
ing to changes in the institutional structures pf the Conununity ~ to make 
whatever conunents it considered necessary on the independent report of the 
Conunittee on Budgets on the increase in thea.iditing and budgetary powers 
of the European Parliament. 
At its meeting of 17 May 1973 the Political Affairs Conunittee appointed 
Mr KIRK draftsman for an opinion for the Conunittee on Budgets. 
On 4 July 1973 the European Parliament decided, in a resolution on the 
strengthening of its budgetary powers, 1 to set up an ad-hoe working party 
on 'budgetary powers' consisting of the bureaux of the Political Affairs 
Conunittee and the Committee on Budgets, together with Mr Fabbrini, Mr Kirk, 
Mr de la Malene and Mr Schuijt. 
The working party held three meetings: on 13 July in London, 30/31 
July in Brussels, and 19 September in Luxembourg. 
The Political Affairs Conunittee discussed the draft opinion at its 
meeting of 14 September 1973 and adopted it at its meeting of 28 September 
1973 by 11 votes to 4 with 2 abstentions. 
The following were present for the vote: Mr Giraudo, chairman; 
Lord Gladwyn, deputy chairman; Mr Radoux, deputy chairman; Mr Kirk, 
draftsman; Sir Tufton Beamish, Mr Berthoin, Mr Bertrand, Mr Blumerf~ld, 
Mr Dalsager, Mr Jahn, Mr Ligios, Mr Patijn, Mr Scelba, Mr Schwabe 
(deputizing for Mr Behrendt). Mr Spenale (deputizing for Mr Faure), 
Mr Thomsen and Mr van der Sanden. 
l OJ No. C 62, 31 July 1973, p.29 
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1. On 24 May 1973 the Bureau authorised the Political Affairs Committee 
to report to the Parliament on the strengthening of its powers. In view 
of the urgency of expressing the Parliament's views concerning the new 
budgetary procedure which is due to be introduced by the community as 
from 1 January 1975, early enough for the Council to have adequate time 
to consider the Parliament•s views before deciding on the form of the 
new budgetary procedure by the end of this year, the Political Committee 
has expressed the view that the budgetary aspects of the powers of the 
Parliament should be examined and debated by the Parliament as a matter 
of priority. The Political Committee has therefore authorised your 
Rapporteur to devote the present report exclusively to the budgetary 
question. A further report will examine the other more general aspects 
of the Parliament's powers. Since budgetary powers are crucial to the 
further development of the role of the Parliament it is recognised by 
members of the Political Affairs Committee that it is important to 
increase the Parliament's budgetary po\\ers in such a way that other 
new powers can be fitted into place without difficulty. 
2. In order to co-ordinate the viewpoints of the Political Affairs 
and Budget committees, and, also, so as to benefit from the advice of 
the Commission, a Joint Working Party composed of members of the two 
relevant committees - and whose meetings have been attended by 
representatives of the Commission - was created by the Parliament during 
its July Session in Strasbourg. 
3. The Joint Working Party has subsequently met in London on 
12 July, in Brussels on 30 and 31 July, and in Luxembourg on 19 September. 
4. At the meeting of the Joint Working Party held on 12 July and at 
the meeting of the Political Affairs Committee held in London at tlat 
time, the majority of members considered that the new budget procedure 
to be adopted as from l January 1975 offers the Parliament an opportunity 
to increase its powers vis-a-vis the Council and thus to change the 
present institutional imbalance in which the Council has the substance of 
power leaving the Parliament and the Commission with the shadow. 
5. The discussions concerning the budgetary powers held in London and 
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Brussels were based on three documents setting out different proposals of 
the Commission: that concerning the second stage of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (European Parliament document 68/73); that concerning the 
reinforcement of budgetary powers (document Com. (73) 1000); and that 
: 
concerning practical measures in view of reinforcing the powers of control 
of the Parliament and improving relations between the Parliament and the 
Commission (European Parliament document 103/73 which is Com. (73) 999). 
6. These three documents make proposals concerning (a) Acts having 
financial implications; . (b) the establishment of the Community budget; and 
(c) a number of other related issues such as the establishment of a 
European Court of Auditors. In the present report, your Rapporteur 
concentrates mostly on (a) and (b), though he does have some comments to male 
concerning certain other points. At the meeting of the Joint Working Party 
held in Brussels on 30 and 31 July, those who were present benefit•d 
greatly from the preparatory work done by Mr Spenale in drawing up, for 
that meeting, a working paper on the budgetary powers of the European 
Parliament (document 124/73) which enabled those taking part in the meeting 
to compare not only the different proposals made by the Commission 
concerning the points at issue, but also, working hypotheses adva~ced by 
Mr. Spenale himself. This document was the basis of an exhaustive 
examination of the main budgetary questions which permitted members of the 
Political Affairs and Budget Committees and representatives of the 
commission, including the responsible CommiS3icre:. ·Mr. Cheysson, to confront 
their different views and to narrow some of the differences between their 
positions. 
7. Whereas at the earlier meetings in London, members discussed three 
separate approaches: (a) the possibility of the Parliament having the last 
word; (b) a second reading procedure; and, (c) co-decision, at the 
meeting of the Joint Working Party held in Brussels at the end of July 
the distinction between these three approaches became blurred in some 
respects. In the present report, your Rapporteur makes proposals which 
incorporate, to a certain extent, all three approaches. 
8. Mr. Spenale, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Budget Committee, will be 
making very detailed proposals concerning the budgetary procedures he 
wishes to see introduced as from 1 January 1975. The present document differs 
in emphasis since it concentrates primarily on the political and 
institutional aspects of the budgetary question. Your Rapporteur hopes that 
his approach will, in many ways, be similar to that adopted by Mr. Spenale, 
and where the two reports differ in emphas~sf this represents your 
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Rapporteur's wish to give the Parliament alternative choices concerning 
one or two of the more controversial points at stake. 
9. It is not difficult to think of ideas which could be applied to the 
new budgetary procedure. A large number of ideas have been put forward 
by pol~ticians and scholars, and there is no problem of there being a 
shortage of suggestions. What your Rapporteur attempts to do in this 
paper is to set out proposals which extend, substantially, the real powers 
of the Parliament concerning both acts with financial implications and 
which are realistic in terms of acceptability to the Council. The 
Parliament must move some distance towards obtaining the power of the 
purse at the beginning of 1975, but it is naive to imagine that it will be 
able to obtain everything it would ideally desire in this respect, and it 
would be dangerously disappointing, on the other hand, if it were to accept 
a new budgetary procedure that gave it only the illusion of increased power 
without the reality. 
Some General Remarks 
10. Before making substantive proposals, your Rapporteur wishes to set out 
some general considerations. 
11. First, it should be noted that the Conunission's proposals are 
essentially short-term, and appear to be only the first part of a process 
of extending Parliamentary power by stages. It is easy to see why this 
should be so and indeed to have some sympathy for the Conunission on this 
point. It is faced with the inunediate need of securing a system of 
effective Parliamentary scrutiny and control for the 1975 budget, and 
clearly the less radical the proposals, the more chance there is of their 
acceptance by the Council. Furthermore, it is an open secret that some 
of the governments of member states are averse to any proposals which 
wo~ld entail amendments to the Treaties being put forward before the 
surrunit Conference planned for 1975. Your Rapporteur does not believe that 
effective Parliamentary control can be established without Treaty amendments, 
and therefore hopes that the Council will not adopt a negative view on 
this point, although he indicates below ways in which some of the most 
important changes could be effective, at least partially, without Treaty 
amendment. He feels very strongly however that, just as any proposals 
made in the budgetary and financial field must not prejudice any 
eventual settlement of the question of Parliament's legislative powers 
generally, so, if we perforce accept the Conunission's step-by-step approach, 
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we must always have in mind our final goal for Parliament, and must 
therefore make sure that any provisional arrangements made this year are 
compatible with what we ultimately desire. 
12. A second general remark concerns the reinforcement of the powers 
of the Parliament concerning proposals made by the Commission. Here it 
is a question of considering whether the Parliament should not try to 
increase its activity and influence concerning the proposals of the 
commission before these are transmitted to the Council. Thus, as your 
Rapporteur proposes in detail later in this report, the Parliament could 
intervene at the very beginning of the Community decision-making process 
at the time when the Commission first formulates its ideas. 
13. A third remark concerns the very vague expressions used by the 
Commission concellling the second-reading procedure that it has proposed in 
the three documents under consideration. 1 As far as members of the 
Political Committee and the Joint Working Party have been prepared to 
accept the second-reading idea, they have considered that it would only 
make sense if three conditions were to apply 
1 
(a) it should be for the Parliament to decide whether or not 
a second-reading procedure should be used; 
(b) decisions of the Council concerning questions with 
financial implications (and, also, the establishment of the 
budget) should not be taken in secrecy 
(c) procedures such as the establishment of a conciliation 
committee or decisions taken by a weighted majority vote 
should be applied in cases of conflict between the Parliament 
and the Council. 
The Vedel Report (Chapter IV, Paragraph 4) was also 
insufficiently precise concerning the conditions under 
which the second-reading procedure should be applied. 
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14. A final general remark concerns the significance of the Parliament's 
decisions concerning the Conununity's budget. The predominant part of 
Community expenditure is not subject to alteration by the Parliament as 
it results from binding decisions previously taken by the Council. This 
process is not very different in nature from a national situation apart 
from the essential point that whereas the national Parliaments have 
themselves decided on binding expenditure, on the Conununity level the 
decisions are taken by the Council with only minimal prior consultation 
of the Parliament. The real signifiance of parliamentary powers today 
thus no longer lies in the right to adopt the budget, but in the right 
to play a full part in decisions on measures with financial implications. 
Emphasis should thus be placed not only on obtaining more po~ers for the 
Parliament in budgetary matters but, equally, concerning decisions with 
financial consequences. ,1, 
Acts with financial implications 
15. At present, the Conunission transmits, for information, its proposals 
to the Parliament at the same time that it sends them to the council. 
However, under the treaties, the Parliament is not formally seized of 
these proposals until the Council requests the Parliament for its 
r ,pinion. Your Rapporteur wishes to propose a new system, as follows, 
go"er,.tng all proposals that would lead to acts with financial 
implications. This new system could be achieved either by a gentlemen's 
agreement or by amendments to the Tre~ty in changing the present 
decision-making procedure. 
16. When tne Commission has established its proposal, it would seize 
the Parliament of this text. The Parliament would then hold a debate on 
the Commission's proposal. This would have the great advantage of 
allowing the Parliament to formulate and express its views concerning 
pr0po,als by tbe Commission having financial implications before the 
Council was seized and before the Governments start to entrench their 
positions. The Commission would then send its proposal (which might or 
might not take into account the amendments voted by the Parliament) 
tog~ther with the amendments adopted by the Parliament - set out as parallel 
texts - to the Council. The Council would then reach its decision 
concerning both the Commission's proposal and the amendments proposed by 
1 See the Vedel Report, Chapter IV Paragraph 2. 
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the Parliament. It would take this decision not in secret but in public. 
When the Council differs AT ALL from the opinion expressed by the Parliament, 
a second reading should be held by the Parliament. If, within a specified 
time limit, the Council should not change its decision so as to agree with 
the Parliament, an automatic conciliation procedure should be adopted.l 
17. This procedure would be automatic and obligatory. If the changes made 
by the Council were minimal or merely semantic in nature, the second-reading 
by the Parliament could be a mere formality. If, however, the Parliament 
considered the changes to be significant ones, it would proceed to a full 
debate. This would avoid the problem of who would define, and how, whether 
the council wished to 'depart markedly' from the opinion given by the 
Parliament on the first consideration. 
18. It has been suggested that a Conciliation committee might be composed 
of the Chairman in Office of the Council and the President of the Parliament. 
But if this were the case, the manoeuvring margin of the representatives of 
both institutions would be too restricted. It is almost impossible to imagine 
how either the Chairman of the Council or the President of the Parliament 
could move away from the positions established by their respective 
institutions. A conciliation procedure might, however, work if there were 
ten representatives of the Council in the Conciliation Committee: the 
Chairman of the Council of the European Communities and one representative 
of Ministerial rank of each of the Member States of the Community. 
The Parliament should be represented also by ten members: its President 
and the Chairman of the political groups of the European Parliament and of 
the Committees of Parliament principally concerned with the subject matter 
of the dispute. 
The Commission of the European Communities would of course participate 
in view of its right of initiative and in an advisory capacity. This 
l When the Legal Affairs Committee was consulted by the Bureau concerning 
the procedure of consultation of the Parliament, in 1970, it concluded, 
in a Note drafted by Mr JOZEAU-MARIGNE, that the present system of 
consultation as established by the EEC Treaty would be the best one 
to maintain unless a new procedure could be introduced under which the 
Parliament would establish, jointly with the Commission of the 
Communities, the texts of the proposals before they were transmitted 
to the Council. The Political Affairs Cormnittee which also studied 
this problem at that time concluded that no judgement should be made 
until the enlargement of the Communities. 
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wider spectrum of membership might allow both sides a greater degree of 
flexibility within the conciliation procedure. An advantage of having a 
comparatively wide membership of the Conciliation Committee would be that 
its proceedi~gs - theugh not public themselves would doubtless provide, 
specifically when the Parliament subsequently debated any compromise 
solution that might be suggested, an opportunity for the public to form 
an opinion of the reasons for the budgetary dispute in question and to be 
informed of the attitudes of the different .institutions and Gpvernments. 
19. Any compromise formula that might be agreed between the representatives 
of the two institutions within the framework of the conciliation committee 
would under this present proposal be binding on the Council and the Parlia-
ment after formal ratification by the two institutions, i.e. it would, 
therefore, have to be submitted to both the council and the Parliament so 
that each institution - the Parliament.· in open debate - would be able to judge 
whether or not the suggested compromise was acceptable. A time limit of 30 
days is suggested to allow each institution to.reach its decision. If both 
institutions agreed with the compromise fornrula proposed by the Conciliation 
Committee, this compromise solution would enter into effect immediately 
following the conclusion of the second of the decisions to be taken respectively 
by the Council and the Parliament. 
20. As far as the third and final phase is concerned, your Rapporteur 
submits two dif~erent ideas for consideration. First there is 
Mr. Spena~e's proposal that the institution taking its decision by the 
highest majority could be applied, leaving the last word in resolving 
the crisis to whichever institution adopted the proposal by the higher 
majority. As.Mr. Spenale has. ~uggested ; "Three possibilities ... arise 
in the end the final word will r~st .with the Assembly if it 
acts by a majority of one-half plus one of its members unless 
the Council acts by the qualified ·majority. 
the final word will also rest with the Assembly if the Commission 
and the Assembly are in agreement or if the Assembly acts by a 
majority of one-half plus one of its members and of two-thirds 
of the votes cast unless the Council acts unanimously. 
the final decision will be vested in the Assembly if it acts by 
the majority of one-half plus one of its members and of three-
quarters of the votes cast". (Doc. PE 33.823/rev). 
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For this system to work effectively it would be necessary for 
the Parliament to insist that decisions of the Council on 
matters with financial implications should be taken in public -
a departure from the traoitional system. The second idea 
is that the Conciliation Committee should quite simply be 
obliged to continue its deliberations until a mutually 
acceptable compromise was found. Its mandate would, 
therefore, be to sit continuously until it had fulfilled 
its obligatory task of proposing a solution. Such a 
solution would, at this stage ( and in the context of 
this proposal), be bin«~ng both on the Council and on 
the Parliament." 
21. Since your Rapporteur is essentially in agreement 
with Mr. Spenale concerning the way in which the Commission's 
different proposals might be modified so as to provide a 
new way of establishing the budget as from 1 January 1975, 
he has little to say on this point. Nevertheless, there 
is one matter on which he wishes to comment. 
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,2. Mr. Spenale suggests that a sub-paragraph 5 (d) might be inserted 
into Article 203 of the EEC Treaty: "The Assembly may, for important reasons, 
by a majority of one-half plus one of its members and two-thirds of the votes 
cast, reject outright the draft budget or some titles of the draft budget in 
order to perrnit the Council to formulate new proposals". Your Rapporteur 
considers that the global rejection of the budget, if used as a wapon on its 
own, is too far-reaching. To reject the whole draft budget because there 
are differences between the Parliament and the Council over a number of 
headings in the budget seems to your Rapporteur to be an extravagant and un-
justified reprisal by the Parliament. Your Rapporteur considers that it 
could often be more effective and more appropriate for the Parliament merely 
to reject those parts of the budget over which it was in disagreement with 
the Council rather than to create a major Community crisis merely because 
it disagrees with~ of the decisions of the Council concerning the con-
tents of the budget. He considers, therefore, in common with Mr. Spenale, 
that the Assembly shculd possess the more nuanced right to reject individual 
headings of the budget, as \I.ell as the more general right - to be used if 
_necessary - of rejecting the whole budget. If this proposal were adopted 
an amendment to Article 204 of the EEC Treaty would be necessary. In the 
f;irst line of the first paragraph, replace t.he words "the budget has not yet 
been voted" by "the budget or parts of the budget have not yet been voted". 
Your Rapporteur notes that in the event of a major budgetary crisis in which 
the Parliament refused to agree to the draft budget the equivalent of one-
twelfth of the previous year's budget would be disbursed each month so as to 
permit the essential working of the Community ~o proceed. 
Court of Auditors 
23. Your Rapporteur is convinced that it is essential to establish a 
Court of Auditors (backed up by a Board of Auditors) as suggested in the 
1973 proposals from the Commission. One of the major priorities of the Com-
munity at the present time should be to ensure that adequate mechanisms be 
created to detect and uncover financial frauds, whether these arise from 
working of the agricultural guarantee funds or elsewhere. At present, one 
of the main sources of discontent with the Common Market amongst the peoples 
of the member countries-is the fraudulant way in which money paid by the tax-
payer to support the Common Agricultural Policy only too often finds its way 
into the pockets of crooks. 
24. At present, a number of points still remain to be cleared up con-
cerning the Court of Auditors. After close examination of the different 
proposals (of 1969 and 1973) from the Commission and the remarks made by 
Mr. Spenale in the working paper submitted to the Joint Working Party at 
the end of July, it is not clear who will be able to request the Court to 
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make specific financial investigations and to whom the Court will be respon-
sible. As the different proposals stress, the Court will be "independent", 
but the fact that the members of the Court are to be appointed by agreement 
letween the Member States (and that they can be reappointed), as proposed in 
the 1973 suggestions from the Commission, might seriously impair the "indepen-
dence" of the Court. Your Rapporteur prefers the alternative method of appoint-
ment proposed by Mr. Spenale by which members of the Court be appointed by the 
Council in agreement with the Parliament. 
25. The role of the Parliament in the appointment of members of the 
Court could take the form of prospective members of the Court being interviewrl, 
in the form of "hearings". by the Parliament's Budget Committee which would 
then report its views to the Parliament on the suitability of the nominees, it 
being for the Parliament as a whole to confirm their appointment or reappoint-
ment. Although the Court should be "inde~endent", it should not exist in a 
political vacuum but should be responsible for its operations to at least one 
of the institutions of the Community. This institution should, in your Rap-
porteur's view, be the Parliament, which should exercise parliamentary super-
vision over the work of the Court. As Mr. Pounder stressed in his amendment 
(adopted by the Parliament during its July sessbn) to the motion for a resolu-
tion accompanying Mr. Spenale's report on the budgetary powers of the Parlia-
ment (doc. 131/73), the auditors "should report to and be at all times avail-
able to assist and advise the Parliament in the exercise of its rights of 
control." Your Rapporteur considers that the Parliament should have the right 
to request the Court to check or examine expenditure wher~ver the Parliament 
considers this to be necessary. Your Rapporteur also proposes that the Court 
of Auditors should submit an annual report on its activities for debate by the 
Parliament. This report should not merely be a record of the Court's "WOrk 
during the previous year, but should set out a programme indicating at least 
some of the financial investigations it planned to carry out during the forth-
coming year. In planning its work and investigations, it should take fully 
into account the views expressed by the Parliament, quite apart from its being 
seized of specific investigations by the Parliament. 
Resources :e;:opres 
26. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to make one or two general remarks 
concerning "own resources". Whereas it is true that the Community already 
possesses, of right, certain own resources in the form of agricultura!Jevies, 
cnstoms duties and 1 % VAT, together with the ECSC levies and that the Communi-
ty is fully autonomous in determining how these own resources may be spent, it 
is essential to note that itis only with the agreement of national governments 
(and thus, implicitly with the prior agreement of national parl.iaments - and 
in certain member states the constitution requires the prior agreement of the 
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Parlianent) that~ Community taxes pass under Community control. The con-
cept of budgetary autonomy of the Community is therefore in the case of .rulli 
Community taxes a relative rather than an absolute one. 
CONCLUSIONS 
27. Your Rapporteur submits this report as a contribution towards the 
budgetary debate that will be held during the Parliament's session of 4 and 
5 October- As has been underlined earlier, the aim of this document is to 
complement, from the political and institutional angles, the more detailed 
and technical proposals that Mr. Spenale will make on behalf of the Budget 
Committee. The present rep~rt is also the first of two reports that your 
Rapporteur is due to submit on behalf of the Political Committee covering 
the whole field of the powers of the Parliament. A second report dealing 
with non-budgetary aspects of the Parliament's powers will be submitted to 
the Parliament at a later stage. In the second report, your Rapport8lr may 
well wish to propose the extension of the decision-making procedure he has 
outlined in the present paper (regarding acts with financial implications) to 
other matters including, possibly, proposals made under Article 235. 
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